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MORE D (DELIBERATION)
FOR CALIFORNIA'S DD (DIRECT DEMOCRACY):
ENHANCING VOTER UNDERSTANDING AND PROMOTING
DELIBERATION THROUGH STREAMLINED NOTICE-ANDCOMMENT PROCEDURES
GLENN

C. SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

In an earlier article, I synthesized and critiqued previous
scholarship in the legal community about "initiatory construction" (the
play on "statutory construction" I used to encompass the distinct task
judges face when construing legislation passed by voter initiative).'
The article preliminarily explored several models for better registering
the intent of initiative sponsors and promoting a deliberative process
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; J.D. 1978, New York
University School of Law; LL.M. 1979, Georgetown University Law Center. The
author wishes to thank his wife Diane Seaberg for editorial assistance and
inspirational support above and beyond the call. He also wishes to thank California
Western School of Law Dean Steven Smith and Associate Dean William Aceves for
important encouragement and support. Former California Western Law Review
Editor-in-Chief Joshua Fox provided crucial and extensive editorial feedback on an
earlier version-and equally crucial encouragement in the overall format concept for
this combination Article-with-substantial appendices. Former Law Review editor
Meredith Van Dyke-King assisted substantially with editing of the Working Group
Report appearing as Appendix II. Luckily, current Editor-in-Chief Chris Powell and
Executive Editor Jessica Labrencis continued in their predecessors' very helpful and
supportive footsteps, and prompted additional improvements.
1. See Glenn C. Smith, Solving the "Initiatory Construction" Puzzle (and
Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U.
COLO. L. REv. 257, 260-86 (2007).
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about the pros and cons of direct-democracy proposals.2 I also
promised to describe in a separate publication how current California
direct-democracy procedures could be adapted for these purposes.3
This Article completes an unusual and circuitous route to
fulfilling that promise. For a variety of reasons, including expressing
the mission of California Western School of Law to "graduate creative
problem solvers committed to the improvement of our legal system
and society,"' it made sense to convene a working group of interested
law-student volunteers (along with two similarly motivated
undergraduates from the University of California, San Diego). The
Working Group produced a report intended for circulation to "private
individuals, public officials, and reform-minded organizations" to
''cause a public conversation about the validity of tailoring California
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to the initiative context."5
Publication of the Working Group Report was delayed as we
pursued a promising, but ultimately unavailing, possibility that a
member of the California Legislature would introduce our initiativereform proposal as a proposed bill. This delay became a happy
accident, however, when the California Western Law Review's "More
Deliberation?" project emerged as the perfect forum for publishing the
Report as a stand-alone document, 6 accompanied by the article I had
always planned to write elaborating on the rationale and design
choices behind the reforms the Report proposes.7
2. Id. at 286-305.
3. Seeid at 299 n.191.
4. Our Mission, CAL. W. SCH. OF LAW, www.cwsl.edu/main/default.asp?
nav-marketing.asp&body-marketing/our-mission.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
5. See infra Appendix II. p. 62. The 2007 article envisioned that its follow-up
piece would pursue the option of adapting current California "legislative"
procedures as one model for enhancing information and deliberation for California's
direct democracy. See Smith, supra note 1, at 299 n. 191. However, this Article and
the Working Group Report reflect the view that the administrative-rulemaking(and
not the legislative) process generally is the more apt model for developing reforms.
See infra Part 11 and Appendix II. pp. 93-95.
6. Because the Report speaks for itself, I have not extensively quoted from or
cited it in this Article-except in Part IV, which is an annotated commentary on the
Working Group's proposal, and in the Conclusion.
7. The Working Group Report reflects a division of labors naturally geared to
our different interests and expertise. The students focused on research and writing
related to documenting current deficiencies in the quality and quantity of
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Both this Article and the Working Group Report seek to enhance
public consideration of the pros and cons of streamlining California's
informal-administrative-rulemaking procedures for reforming the
state's direct democracy. To provide a concrete focus for discussion
and quick adoption, Appendix I includes proposed amendments to
existing California statutory provisions. In essence, the proposed
amendments would:
* require initiative sponsors to communicate more fully with the
public about their legislative intent;
* establish a meaningful yet manageable structure by which
interested parties can discuss the initiative proposals; and
* authorize courts to give appropriate consideration to the public
record generated by proposals 1 & 2 in interpreting initiatives
that have been adopted into law.
This Article provides a context for considering the proposed
legislation by elaborating on five questions:
Why Deliberation? (Part I): In this Part, the Article makes the
case, both on the substantive merits and on practical political grounds,
for focusing on deliberation-enhancementas the best "next wave" of
initiative reform.8
Why the Administrative Model? (Part II): This Part expands the
arguments in the Working Group Report to defend an assertion that
might seem initially counter-intuitive: even though orthodox directdemocracy rhetoric assumes that voters endorsing initiatives are like

information and deliberation about proposed initiatives. See infra Appendix II. pp.
62-78. I wrote the section summarizing my 2007 article. See infra Appendix II. pp.
78-81. Additionally, as a longstanding teacher of legislation and administrative law
and as a drafter and defender of federal legislation in a prior incarnation from 1979
through 1983 as a staff counsel to the United States Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, I concentrated on writing and explaining our proposed
reform legislation. See infra Appendix I. pp. 56-59 (draft of proposed legislation),
Appendix II. pp. 87-95 (explaining proposal and its rationale). The Report was truly
a collaboration, however, as all working group members edited each others' work
and approved the final product.
8. The advantages attributed in Part I to deliberation promotion apply
especially to the Working Group proposal. But, as noted at several points in that
Part, some of the advantages could be realized to some extent from the adoption of
other deliberation enhancing proposals.
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legislators passing bills, in reality, the closer analogy is to the roles
and dynamics common to administrative rulemaking.
Why Streamlined Informal Rulemaking? (Part III): Assuming the
appropriateness of an administrative rulemaking model, an obvious
next question arises because both my 2007 article and the Working
Group Report propose a substantially streamlined version of the
informal-notice-and-comment procedures California (like most other
states and the federal government) uses to make administrative rules.
A skeptic might ask: if the administrative rulemaking model is so
appropriate in describing the relationship of voters to initiative
proponents, why shouldn't the full panoply of notice-and-comment
procedures (including multiple potential stages of judicial review) be
transposed into the direct-democracy context? Part III presents
answers grounded both in appropriate public policy and political
practicality. Specifically, this Part identifies several "design
specifications" for savvy selective borrowing.
Why This Proposal's Specific Choices? (Part IV): This Part relates
the numerous design choices reflected in our reform proposal to the
design specifications identified in Part III. The discussion explains
which aspects of California's current administrative-rulemaking
procedures the reform proposal borrows, adapts, and ignores-and
why.
What Strategic Questions Remain on the Way to Proposal
Enactment? (Part V): Getting a reform proposal from final
formulation to actual adoption raises a number of strategic questions.
This Part addresses four questions facing anyone considering how to
adopt streamlined notice-and-comment procedures for direct
democracy.
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I. WHY DELIBERA TION? 9 THE SEVERAL ADVANTAGES OF
DELIBERATION-BASED REFORM PROPOSALS

Legislators, special study commissions, good-government groups,
and reform-minded individuals regularly spend substantial time and
energy on serious proposals to improve California's initiative process.
Unfortunately, enhancing quality information about initiative
proposals and establishing meaningful opportunities to discuss their
merits and implications are hardly the prime focus of these efforts.
In a recent edition of the California Western Law Review, coauthor Brendan Bailey and I systematically analyzed the last fourteen
years of initiative-reform proposals considered at some stage of the
California legislative process.'o This study revealed that only thirtyone (or 35%) of these eighty-seven reform proposals related to
deliberation in any meaningful way." Focusing on the thirty proposals

passing both houses of the Legislature, only three (10%) of the
proposals related primarily to deliberation, whereas five (fewer than
17%) related to deliberation secondarily. 12
9. This Article uses the phrase "deliberation" and its variations, such as
"deliberation-enhancing," to refer to proposals that enhance the quality and extent of
information available about initiative proposals, proposals that provide efficient, yet
meaningful procedures by which that information can be debated and discussed, or
proposals thatfurther both goals. When deliberation in the narrower sense of debate,
discussion, or consultation about initiative proposals is intended, those words, or
variations of those words, are used.
10. Glenn C. Smith & Brendan Bailey, Legislative Reform of California's
Direct Democracy: A Field Guide to Recent Efforts, 47 CAL. W. L. REv. 259 (2011).
11. Id. at 274 tbl.1, apps. A, B, C & D at 287-300 (summarizing basis for
classification of individual proposal relationship to deliberation). Only ten (or
11.5%) of the proposals were "primarily" related to deliberation, in the sense that
they would do one of the following: (1) prompt more deliberation between interested
parties about initiative proposals, (2) provide additional information to voters (or
opinion leaders in a position to provide information or "cues" to voters), or (3)
enhance the quality of information already provided. Id. at 266. Another twenty-one
(or 24%) were "secondarily" linked to deliberation, in that they either (1) enhanced
the ability of voters to make sense of existing information, by making information
more accessible or enhancing the ability of voters to evaluate the credibility of
information provided by proponents or other opinion leaders, or (2) sought to
change the initiative process in ways that, without intending it, would have
information or discussion opportunities as an indirect byproduct. Id. at 266-67.
12. See id at 274 tbl.1, apps. A & B at 287-90 (summarizing basis for
classification of individual proposal relationship to deliberation).
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Proposals by non-legislative institutions and individuals reveal a
similar pattern. The Center for Governmental Studies' comprehensive
and authoritative 2008 study of the initiative process proposes twentysix reforms; four focus primarily on improving information and public
discussion, and three would improve deliberation indirectly.' A
predominance of focus on reforming the political dynamics
surrounding, and substantive impact of, legislation by initiative can
also be found in such sources as a 1999 League of Women Voters
study,14 the 2002 report issued by the Speaker's Commission on the
California Initiative Process,15 and a very recent critique with

13. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT app. A at 361-66 (2d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE], available at http://www.cgs.org/images/
publications/cgs dbi full book f.pdf. Recommendations focusing primarily on
improving deliberation are recommendation 1, id at 361-62 (proposing a thirty-day
public comment period and a legislative hearing for initiatives likely to qualify for
the ballot), recommendation 15, id. at 364 (proposing user-friendly redesign of
initiative-related information on the Secretary of State's website), and
recommendation 16, id. (identifying ways to improve information in the ballot
pamphlet provided to voters). Recommendations related to deliberation secondarily
are recommendation 4, id. at 362 (moving up the timing of the "impartial analysis"
the Legislative Analyst prepares for initiative proposals) and recommendation 17, id.
at 365 (applying readability standards to officially provided information on initiative
proposals). .
14. J. Fred Silva, The California Initiative Process: Background and
Perspective, PUB. POL'Y INST. CAL. 15-16 (Nov. 2000), http://www.ppic.org/
content/pubs/op/OP 11OOFSOP.pdf (summarizing recommendations of a 1999
"restudy" that "Updated" the League's 1984 analysis; two out of twenty-two
recommendations related to public hearings on initiative proposals and reading-level
of ballot-pamphlet analyses).
15.

THE SPEAKER'S COMM'N ON THE CAL. INITIATIVE PROCESS, FINAL REPORT

(2002) [hereinafter SPEAKER'S REPORT]. Two of the Commission's nine
recommendations focus specifically on improving the quality of voter information
about initiative proposals. See id. at 9 (recommendation 5, providing ballotpamphlet disclaimer that the constitutionality of initiative proposals have not been
determined, and recommendation 6, requiring the Secretary of State to select the
arguments against proposed initiatives). Three other recommendations seek to
promote deliberation indirectly by improving voter cues about the sponsorship of
initiatives before and during signature gathering, see id. (recommendations 2 & 3) or
at the ballot-pamphlet stage, see id. (recommendation 4).
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recommendations published by two veteran observers of California
politics.' 6
The point is not that non-deliberation-focused proposals are
misguided or wrongheaded. Most proposals are well-intentioned
efforts to remedy perceived deficiencies. But the inescapable reality is
that few of these proposals have succeeded.17
Reformers would do well to turn to deliberation-enhancing
reforms, both to improve their batting average and to bring real
improvements to direct democracy. As Subpart A below points out,
even though California is ahead of most states in providing
information and arguments in the Official Voter Information Guide,
significant deficits in information and discussion still remain.
Therefore, as Subpart B delineates, enhancing the quality and extent
of information available about initiative proposals and providing
efficient, yet meaningful procedures by which that information can be
discussed and debated can advance five worthy goals. Finally, as
Subpart C explains, the advantages of improved deliberation about
initiative proposals, valid in its own right, brings with it political
advantages often not found in other kinds of reform proposals.

16. JOE MATHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACKUP: How REFORM
BROKE THE GOLDEN STATE AND How WE CAN FIx IT (2010). In one of the five

chapters devoted to systematic reform of California's governmental system,
Mathews and Paul recommend six ideas for initiative reform. See id. at 174-83.
None of the six ideas relates to primarily improving the information about initiatives
provided to voters or to enhancing deliberation among interested parties. However,
the adoption of one idea, in which initiative proposals would be considered by the
California Legislature and could offer amendments to proponents or place a
"counterproposal" on the ballot, would as a byproduct generate more information
and deliberation. See id. at 178-81 (discussing proposal and concluding that under it
"a campaign is likely to be comparative, focusing attention and debate on the
contents of the two measures").
17. For example, although eighty-seven initiative-reform proposals were
introduced into the California Legislature in the fourteen-year period from 1997 to
2010, only five were enacted into law. See Smith & Bailey, supra note 10, at 274
tbl. 1. This .070 batting average looks even worse, given that one of the five was a
"mostly non-substantive .. . code cleanup" bill and that all of the remaining changes
were relatively modest as well. See id. at 279-80.
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A. DeliberationDeficits in California
It is well documented that voters in California and other directdemocracy states face serious "informational deficits" when they are
called upon to assume the duties of legislators by voting on important
initiative proposals. This is the clear consensus of the extensive prior
scholarship synthesized in my 2007 article.' 8
California leads the way in providing summaries and analyses of
ballot propositions by two different state officials in the Official Voter
Information Guide, usually referred to as the "ballot pamphlet," which
is mailed to all registered-voter households and posted on the
California Secretary of State's Internet webpage.19 Despite this,
important information gaps still plague consideration of initiatives in
California. The analyses cited in, and original research done for, the
Working Group Report attest to this. 20 Other analyses of California's
direct democracy are in accord. 2 1 And the handful of recent legislative
proposals aimed at providing improved information about the merits

18. See Smith, supra note 1, at 263-65 (discussing "substantial macro- and
micro-level empirical evidence" from California and other states, which
demonstrates voters lack adequate information, misunderstand the details of
initiative proposals, and vote contrary to their stated intentions).
19. Under established practice, the California Attorney General provides the
official title and an up-to-100-word summary (presented in a series of "bulleted"
phrases) of each proposition on the ballot. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9004 (West Supp.
2011). The California Legislative Analyst then provides an "analysis" containing
information about the background, key features, and fiscal effects of each measure.
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9087 (West 2003). The Legislative Analyst's analysis of fiscal
effects on state and local governments is also summarized in the form of "bulleted"
statements at the end of the Attorney General's summary section. CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 9051 (West Supp. 2012).
20. See infra Appendix II. pp. 67-73.
21. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 17; SPEAKER'S
REPORT, supra note 15, at 11; Richard Frankel, Note, Proposition209: A New Civil
Rights Revolution?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 431, 447 (2000) (citing evidence
from opinion-poll questions and exit-poll extrapolations suggesting that many voters
supporting Proposition 209 did not think it would "end .

.

. measures designed to

help members of racial minorities," even though that was the Proposition's central
purpose and effect).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol48/iss1/2

8

Smith: More D (Deliberation) for California's DD (Direct Democracy): Enh

2011]

MORE

D (DELIBERATION)

9

and implications of initiative proposals assume that substantial room
exists for making the process more educational.2 2
Another main deficiency in California's initiative process is the
lack of meaningful opportunities for debate among supporters and
opponents and discussion among interested parties. The ballot
pamphlet provides a venue for the former by structuring a
point/counterpoint exchange between an official group of supporters
and one slate of opponents. 23 Still, this format often generates more
heat than light 24 and can result in proponents and opponents talking
22. See Smith & Bailey, supra note 10, at 271-72 & nn.30-33 (summarizing
A.B. 1245, requiring thirty-day comment period on proposed initiatives prior to
circulation; S.B. 384, requiring public hearing after proposal achieved minimum
signature percentage; A.B. 677, generating "nonbinding advisory opinion" about
proposal constitutionality from retired state judge panel; A.B. 1500, moving up
deadline for legislative hearings on qualified initiatives; S.B. 1243, transferring
authority to hold public hearings from legislature to Little Hoover Commission; and
A.C.A. 18, in part transferring authority to prepare summary of proposals for ballot
pamphlet); id. apps. B & C at 288-96 (summarizing, among other bills, S.B. 1208,
making Legislative Analyst Office solely responsible for describing in ballot
pamphlet fiscal implications of proposals; S.B. 2946 requiring proposals to be
understandable to average voter; A.C.A. 14, limiting each election ballot to five
proposals; A.B. 943, moving up deadline for legislative hearings on qualified
initiatives; A.B. 1500, also moving up hearing deadline; and A.B. 1233, authorizing
Attorney General to send pre-circulation initiative to Legislative Counsel for
constitutional analysis). Of course, some of these proposals also seek to create
forums for public discussion and debate about initiative proposals, thus recognizing
the need for more deliberative venues stated in the next paragraph.
23. By law, one group of supporters and one coalition of opponents may
include no-more-than-500-word "arguments" pro and con. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9064
(West 2003). Each side may also respond to opposing arguments with shorter, nomore-than-250-word "rebuttals." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9069 (West 2003).
24. See, e.g., infra Appendix II. pp. 65-66, 68-69 (analyzing deficiencies in
1996 and 2008 election information). The more recent ballot pamphlet issued for the
November 2010 election confirms that the more-heat-than-light phenomenon is alive
and well. To take just two examples, opponents of Proposition 20 (which would
have taken the power to draw congressional districts from the California Legislature
and given it to the fourteen-member commission previously established to draw
state legislative boundaries) emphasized that the proposal was the "brainchild" of
the son of a "multi-billionaire Wall Street tycoon," and urged voters not to let "OUR
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC [become] A TOY TO BE PLAYED WITH FOR THE
SELF-AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE IDLE SECOND-GENERATION RICH."
CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: NOVEMBER 2, 2010,
GENERAL ELECTION 23 (2010) [hereinafter NOVEMBER 2010 VOTER GUIDE],
available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig20l0/general/pdflenglish/complete-vig.pdf.
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past each other.2 5 Even when disputants provide seemingly objective
information and there is joinder of rational debate, the space
limitations and the format of allowing only one rebuttal exchange can
leave attentive voter-readers with more questions than answers. 2 6 Of
Proponents, in turn, characterized Proposition 20 as a method by which voters could
"stand up to the politicians and special interests," and "STOP THE BACKROOM
DEALS" by which "legislators and their paid consultants draw districts behind
closed doors to guarantee that their friends in Congress are reelected" instead of
"voters choosing who will represent them." Id. at 22. In similar fashion, opponents
of Proposition 24 (which would have repealed business tax concessions negotiated
as part of a California budget deal) called proponents people who "never met a tax
they didn't like" and "won't reduce lavish public pensions, yet have no problem
raising taxes on everyone else" in league with "Sacramento politicians." Id. at 50.
Proponents, in turn, characterized opponents as "some of the largest corporations in
the nation, whose greed knows no end" and who employ "scare tactics and
distortions . . . illustrat[ing] how desperate these multi-state corporations and their

CEOs are to take advantage of these additional tax breaks while ordinary
Californians foot the bill." Id. at 51.
25. See, e.g., infra Appendix II. p. 70 (discussing how proponents of
Proposition 92, a 2008 ballot initiative, were able to avoid responding to fiscal
concerns raised by opponents in their ballot pamphlet argument). The more recent
Proposition 20 example is also illustrative here. Beyond their vilification of the other
side, proponents of congressional redistricting by non-legislator commission
emphasized voter empowerment and breaking up overly cozy legislator-consultantcongressional incumbent relationships. NOVEMBER 2010 VOTER GUIDE, supra note
24, at 22. Opponents instead emphasized the "waste" of "taxpayer dollars" in
funding the commission and the "non-accountab[ility] of the "14-person
bureaucracy." Id.
26. For example, voters trying to decide on the fiscal implications of
Proposition 24's proposed repeal of $1.7 billion in business tax breaks confronted
two very different accounts of how many businesses would benefit from the present
tax breaks and what the fiscal implications of repealing them would be. Proponents
claimed that only 2% of "the wealthiest, multi-state corporations" would benefit,
while "98% of California's businesses, especially small businesses, would get
virtually no benefit." Id at 50. The "rebuttal" placed immediately below this
argument called the proponent's claim false and instead asserted that "State
Franchise Tax Board records show Proposition 24 could impact 120,000 businesses"
who "can't survive more tax increases." Id. Perhaps both statements are correct, and
the key to reconciling them depends upon the difference between being able to
"benefit" from the tax breaks versus being "impacted" by them; but the total
exchange gave voters no way to decide which side was being more accurate.
Similarly, Proposition 24 proponents characterized it as benefitting the
California economy by making it possible to "give[] tax incentives to California's
small businesses that actually create jobs for Californians" and "put $1.7 billion
back into the treasury to help our students, schools and public safety." Id. (Although
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course, the unofficial ways in which proponents and opponents
present their positions to voters-primarily through saturation
advertising in general media and mailers targeted to specific types of
voters (called "slate mailers") 27-are even less likely to provide
detailed and useful information.2 8 In part this is because there is even

the opponents didn't make the point, an attentive reader would note that both of
these alternatives can't be pursued at the same time. Either the $1.7 billion in budget
savings could fund small-business tax breaks or it could be spent on worthy publicspending goals, but not both.) Opponents presented a very different picture of
economic effects: "Proposition 24 penalizes job growth and encourages businesses
to expand into OTHER states-taking good jobs and tax revenue with them." Id. at
51. The impartial Legislative Analyst's analysis explained with admirable
sophistication (and through a highly readable figure 1) how the present tax law
worked and how it would be changed by repealing the tax concessions. See id. at 4649. But the Analyst provided no information by which voters could assess the
validity of the competing claims summarized earlier in this paragraph.
Another example is Proposition 23, which would have suspended
implementation of strict California air pollution control laws until unemployment
dropped to 5.5% or less for a year. The byplay of point and counterpoint left voters
no way to decide between contradictory assertions by proponents that adoption of
the proposition would "save[] over one million California jobs," and by opponents
that adoption would "jeopardize nearly 500,000 jobs." Id. at 44.
27. For a further discussion of the uses and abuses of initiative-campaign
advertising and of targeted slate mailers, see DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note
13, at 253-63.
28. One representative slate mailer received by the author shortly before the
November 2010 election said the following about Proposition 27, the alternative
ballot measure offered by opponents of Proposition 20 (which would draw
congressional boundaries by a fourteen-member non-legislator commission):
"Proposition 27 - Yes. Stop Wasting $$$Millions$$$ on bureaucratic nonsense.
Send the Sacramento politicians a Message! 'Yes on Prop 27."' VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR INDEPENDENTS: NOVEMBER
2, 2010, GENERAL ELECTION (2010) (on file with author). The slate mailer's
discussion of Proposition 24 is a bit more substantive; it consists in its entirety of the
following two paragraphs appearing in separate places on one side:
Yes on Prop 24. The Tax Fairness Act. Prop. 24 prevents $1.3 billion in
budget cuts to our schools and public safety. It saves thousands of jobs,
with no tax increase. Stop corporate tax giveaways that don't create jobs.
Proposition 24 - Yes. You can stop the corporate tax giveaway that

came from a back room deal. Protect funding for schools and public safety
with no tax increase.
Id. As noted earlier, the validity of these arguments about economic effect are
debatable. See supra note 26.
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less potential for "joinder" of opposing positions and give-and-take
than in the ballot pamphlet.
Current deficiencies would be less problematic if an efficient and
effective way existed for interested and knowledgeable individuals
and organizations to discuss the merits .and implications of proposed
initiatives. Such discussions could generate useful information about
initiative proposals even before the ballot pamphlet arrives in
mailboxes and is posted on a webpage; the additional information
flowing from such public discussion could help voters put the ballotpamphlet analyses and arguments in context and resolve some
unresolved questions. Alas, there is no venue, by legal requirement or
tradition, for such discussion.
B. Five Substantive Benefits from Deliberation-EnhancingReforms
Any reform designed to enhance direct-democracy deliberation
promises benefits to voters; depending upon its particular design, it
could benefit other stakeholders in the initiative process. This Section
examines five of these benefits, all of which would be furthered by the
Working Group's streamlined notice-and-comment proposal.
1. Better InformationFlowing Directly to Voters
Even if many California voters do not make a sophisticated
attempt to learn about the merits and implications of proposed
initiatives, 29 a portion of California's most politically aware and
engaged voters likely do. 30 Providing more useful information29. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 81 (noting view of
"critics of the initiative process" that "voters have neither the time nor the interest to
understand fully the wide range of complicated issues that are often involved" in
initiative proposals); Smith, supra note 1, at 265 & n.36 (citing Christopher A.
Coury, Note, Direct Democracy Through Initiative and Referendum: Checking the
Balance, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 573, 593 (1994) (suggesting that
voters can understand "general policies" but not "details")); Stephen H. Sutro,
Comment, Interpretationof Initiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons of
Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
945, 967 (1994) (doubting the ability of voters to make "advanced judgments").
30. That a percentage of California voters are using secondary sources other
than the ballot pamphlet in a relatively active effort to assess initiatives' merits is
likely reflected in 2000 survey data showing that twenty-five percent of likely voters
find "websites about initiatives set up by government and independent sources" to
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especially about sponsor intentions and especially in a forum enabling
knowledgeable individuals and organizations to discuss the scope,
implications, and wisdom of initiatives-could directly empower
these voters.3 1
Close vote margins often determine whether initiatives pass or
32
fail. Thus, it matters both in terms of sound public policy and
democratic legitimacy, if even a relatively small percentage of voters
who make the difference in initiative outcomes cast more informed
and meaningful votes. The information deficits in the current system
likely lead to significant voter frustration and cynicism.33 A more
informed voting experience could help counteract this.
2. Better Informationfor "Cue Givers"
Observers of direct democracy have long noticed that the general
phenomenon of "cue giving," in which decision-makers look to more
knowledgeable, trusted sources for cues about how to act, is strongly
at work in the initiative process.3 4 Many voters rely on the
be "very useful." Silva, supra note 14, at 25. Twenty-two percent find "news stories
about the initiatives that appear in the media" very useful as well. Id.
31. Although this Article and the Working Group Report assert that the
streamlined notice-and-comment process we propose would maximally benefit
voters, other proposals could achieve similar benefits at least partially. For example,
enactment of A.B. 1245 of 2003, former Assembly Member Laird's proposal to
subject initiative proposals to a thirty-day comment period-without requiring
sponsors to provide any further information beyond their proposed text-would
have set up a forum for discussion of initiative pros and cons and given substantial
new information to voters (and, as explored immediately below, to individuals and
organizations giving cues to voters) about how others view the sponsor's handiwork.
For a full discussion of the background and rationale behind A.B. 1245, see John
Laird & Clyde MacDonald, A.B. 1245 of 2003-An Attempt at Modest Reform of
California'sInitiativeProcess, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 301 (2011).
32. For example, Proposition 11 of 2008, which stripped the State Legislature
of the power to draw state electoral district boundaries, was approved by a margin of
less than two percent. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4,
2008, GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/sov/2008_general/sovcomplete.pdf.
33. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 54-55, 57
(reporting that forty-seven percent of California voters have little or no confidence
in the ability of the electorate to make policy).
34. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, DemocratizingDirect Democracy: Restoring
Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "DisclosurePlus," 50 UCLA L.
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organizational affiliation of supporters and opponents; voters support
initiatives endorsed by interest groups and individuals with whom
they feel an affinity of interests and oppose initiatives endorsed by
groups and individuals standing for positions voters oppose. 35 The
most relevant aspect of the ballot-pamphlet argument-and-rebuttal
section for such voters is likely the identity and affiliation of those
individuals and organizations quoted in, or signing, the arguments and
rebuttals. 3 6 A similar view that endorsements or expressions of
1141, 1149-51 (2003); John G. Matsusaka, Subversion of the Many by the
Few: Some Scientific Evidence on the Initiative Process, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 511, 530 (2004) ("[T]he evidence shows that voters are able to use
information cues (such as endorsements by trusted sources) to make the right
decisions in the voting booth.").
35. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 242 ("By finding
voter information from a community group aligned with their own interests and
priorities, voters can participate in the electoral process without spending as much
time to inform themselves . . . ."); Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils of
HybridDemocracy, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 233 (2006) ("[In] initiative campaigns. .
. [voters] work to determine which groups support or oppose the ballot measure, the
intensity of their views, and how the groups' preferences line up with those of
voters."); Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, CryptoInitiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 957-58
(2005) (citing ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOw? 54-59 (1998))
(noting that the existence of "common interests" between voter and endorser is one
criterion by which voters gauge endorser-trustworthiness).
36. Compare, e.g., NOVEMBER 2010 VOTER GUIDE, supra note 24, at 36
("Argument in Favor of Proposition 22" claiming support "by a BROAD
COALITION" including "California Fire Chiefs Association, Peace Officers
REV.

Research Association of California . . . , [1]ocal paramedics and 9-1-1 dispatch

operators, California Police Chiefs Association, California Library Association . . . ,
California Transit Association, League of California Cities, California Alliance for
Jobs, California Chamber of Commerce, More than 50 local chambers of commerce
[and] More than 300 cities and towns"), with id. at 36-37 ("Rebuttal to Argument in
Favor of Proposition 22" and "Argument Against Proposition 22" citing opposition
from Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Fullerton Association for Concerned
Taxpayers, President of the National Taxpayer Limitation Committee, and claiming
"that's why the California Teachers Association, joined by school principals and
parents across the state, say strongly: Vote NO").
Unsurprisingly, the signatories of arguments and rebuttals both favoring and
opposing Proposition 24's proposed repeal of tax breaks for businesses included
individuals whose organizational affiliations suggested roots in the business
community, those advocating for taxpayers, and representatives of sympathetic
social groups such as teachers and seniors. Compare id at 50-51 (proponent ballot-
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opposition matter to many voters is implicit in their emphasis in
campaign advertisements and slate mailers.3 7
The extent to which print and broadcast media take editorial
positions on initiatives also indicates a belief that the media provide
relevant "cues" to voters. That supportive or opposing media
evaluations are prominently featured in initiative campaign ads and
voter-guide mailers 38 further underlines the perceived significance of
the media as cue givers.
Reforms enhancing deliberation in California's direct democracy
are thus important even for the (presumably larger) group of voters
who will not access and use enhanced information directly. Improving
the ability of cue givers to more accurately understand the intent of
initiative sponsors and learn through enhanced discussion what other
experts think will lead to more informed cue giving. Many voters will
benefit indirectly.
3. Better Assurance to Initiative Sponsors that
Their Intent Will Be Realized
To state the obvious, the individuals and organizations spending
millions to draft, qualify for the ballot, and enact initiative proposals
presumably want to achieve their strategic goals. One way sponsor
goals are frustrated is when adopted initiatives are construed contrary
to the intent of initiative sponsors during judicial review.3 9 Strategic
pamphlet signers associated with North Sacramento Chamber of Commerce,
California Tax Reform Association, Congress of California Seniors, California
Teachers Association, California Federation of Teachers, and League of Women
Voters), with id. (opponent ballot-pamphlet signers associated with California Small
Business Alliance, California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, California
Taxpayers' Association, The Seniors Coalition, California State Board of Education
and California Secretary of Education).
37. For example, the two-page Voter Information Guide references the
endorsements of the following organizations and interests: the League of Women
Voters, the Lung Association, the National Wildlife Federation, and "police [and]
firefighters" generally. VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 28.
38. For example, the Voter Information Guide enhances its encouragement to
vote "No on Prop 22" with a statement that "Los Angeles Times, San Francisco
Chronicle and Sacramento Bee all say Vote NO!" Id.
39. To take just one example, the California Supreme Court likely interpreted
Proposition 8, the "Victims' Bill of Rights" initiative adopted in 1982 in a manner
inconsistent with the intention of its sponsors and the voters who endorsed the
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sponsor goals could also be thwarted any time their intent is distorted
by overly simplistic or even demagogic opposition arguments and
those arguments "stick" because sponsors lack venues in which to
counteract them.
Any deliberation-enhancing reforms giving sponsors greater
opportunities to clarify their intent or position could benefit "goodfaith" sponsors-that is, sponsors who honestly think that their idea
and intent will attract majority support if only they can communicate
them effectively.4 0 Along the way, providing enhanced opportunities
for sponsor intentions to be more fully recorded would likely
counteract the anomaly that California courts tend to give the
characterizations of initiatives by opponents a weight equal to the
interpretations placed on initiatives by their proponents.41 (This is
contrary to the "long accepted assumption that statements by
legislation supporters (especially sponsors!) are entitled to greater
weight than statements by opponents.") 42
4. Better Informationfor Courts ConstruingInitiatives
State courts in direct-democracy states-and especially California
courts-are regularly put in the difficult situation of deciding how
initiatives apply to complicated situations not definitively addressed
measure. See Cathy R. Silak, The People Act, the Courts React: A ProposedModel
for InterpretingInitiatives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 51-52 (1995) (criticizing
majority opinion in People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985) for retaining trialcourt discretion to exclude evidence of defendant's prior felony convictions despite
Proposition 8's strong victims-rights intent).
40. Of course, some critics of direct democracy in general or specific
initiatives in particular would say that at times sponsors are the ones banking on
simplistic appeals or demagoguery to advance their goals. See, e.g., Smith, supra
note 1, at 288 (noting that "direct-democracy literature regularly portrays initiative
sponsors as hiding their true intent behind disingenuously titled texts of inordinate
length and impenetrable content, engaging in deceptive and simplistic campaigns for
voter approval, and even opposing the initiatives of others with 'Trojan House'
alternative initiatives"). Happily, enhanced-deliberation proposals would not-and
do not seek to-help a "bad-faith" sponsor seeking to "sell" an idea that will not
stand up to deliberation or scrutiny.
41. Id. at 269 (noting how "California courts routinely discuss the views of
initiative sponsors and opponents as a package, as though they are of equal
significance").
42. Id.
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by the text the voters adopted or the ballot-pamphlet information
accompanying the initiative.4 3 Typical of the tack taken by their sisterstate colleagues, California jurists have adopted an ironic and illusory
approach. They spend great effort searching for an unrealistically
detailed "voter intent," often in the process citing arcane presumptions
and rules of construction obviously beyond the contemplation of any
voter who is not a lawyer specializing in statutory interpretation.4 At
the same time, California judges generally ignore detailed indicators
from the direct-democracy participants most likely to have a specific
intent, the sponsors of initiatives.4 5
Deliberation enhancing reforms could solve this initiatoryconstruction puzzle. Any proposal generating more information about
sponsor intent-and especially the Working Group's notice-andcomment proposal, which would enhance the clarity of sponsors'
intent both in their initial notice of intent and in the response they
43. For example, People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564, 565 (Cal. 2005) required
the California Supreme Court to determine whether "the trial court's discretionary
authority under Penal Code section 1170.19, subdivision (a), to commit a minor to
the Youth Authority applies only when the minor meets the eligibility requirements
of Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6." In answering in the affirmative
despite the lack of clear guidance from the initiative text or the ballot-pamphlet
information, the court had to "interpret[] and cross-referenc[e] five statutes from two
different codes." Id. at 568.
44. See, e.g., id. (assuming voters cross-referenced five statutes to arrive at a
definitive intent); Smith, supra note 1, at 266 (discussing two other recent California
Supreme Court cases attributing highly sophisticated legal distinctions to voters).
45. Judges will, of course, consult intent indicators that make it into the ballotpamphlet argument and rebuttal-or draw meaning from the absence of such
indicators. See, e.g., Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 959-60 (Cal. 2003)
(finding voters were aware that proposition would enhance punishment for gangrelated misdemeanors because of statements in opponents' ballot-pamphlet
argument); Hodges v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 433, 438 (Cal. 1999) (referencing
ballot-pamphlet "arguments for and against" the proposition at issue). But, as noted
earlier, ballot-pamphlet space is limited and arguments are pitched at a more general
level and are focused more on political sloganeering than the kind of rational
discourse likely to establish detailed intent about an initiative's scope and intended
application, including issues that typically have arisen in litigation. See infra
Appendix II. pp. 82-84 tbl. 1 (listing several dozen post-enactment judicial decisions
about how initiatives interact with constitutional and statutory provisions, prior
judicial decisions, and other ballot pamphlets; whether initiatives apply
retroactively; and how criminal and civil-law changes intend to affect typical parties
in litigation).
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would make to comments from interested parties-would give courts
more adequate bases for initiatory construction. Judges are
particularly likely to rely on additional sponsor-intent information
(whether they actually reference such reliance or not) if the process in
which it is generated is transparent, reliable, and likely to be consulted
by attentive voters and persons giving cues to voters.
Better judicial decisionmaking about initiatory construction would
have a number of corollary beneficiaries-even beyond the initiative
sponsors who would benefit from decisions more fully achieving their
intentions. First, this would derivatively benefit all who support the
sponsored initiatives, including every California voter knowledgeably
favoring the policy changes the initiatives embody. Further, the
California judiciary would benefit. Even if they rarely articulate it,
California judges likely understand that their detailed voter-intent
attributions are fanciful. Improved decisionmaking thus promises to
enhance the judicial sense of intellectual honesty. At the same time it
eases the difficult no-win political situation in which jurists are placed
(especially in California, where they are periodically subject to
electoral retaliation in retention and recall elections) 4 6 when having to
render potentially unpopular rulings seeming to oppose the people's
will. 4 7 Finally, authoritatively answering some of the interpretive
questions now swirling around many initiatives after their enactment
could eliminate the number of lawsuits filed (or at least simplify the
legal issues that must be considered in these lawsuits).4 8

46. California trial-court judges must run for reelection every six years;
intermediate-appellate and Supreme Court justices must win a retention election
every twelve years. Selection of Judges, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/methods/selection of judges.cfm
?state=CA (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). California judges at all three levels are
subject to recall elections. Removal of Judges, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/methods/removalof judges.cfm?
state=CA (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
47. See Smith, supra note 1, at 272 & n.69.
48. Budget savings from taxpayer funds not spent on participation in initiatory
construction litigation could be especially welcome in an era of acute state and local
budget pressures.
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5. Better Initiatives
Ultimately, bringing more deliberation to California's direct
democracy should improve public-policy outputs. Sponsors would
likely be more careful in drafting their proposals if they had to explain
their intent (and also answer targeted queries about the scope and
application of their proposed law changes) in an authoritative
document that is subject to comment by a range of interested parties
and is likely to be relied upon by voters, cue givers, and judges. If
better information leads to better outcomes-a core assumption
underlying representative democracy, lawmaking by legislative
bodies, and rulemaking by administrative agencieS49-more
deliberation should bring more quality as well to lawmaking by
initiative. The economic, social, political, and legal benefits flowing
from adopting better-thought-out initiatives may not be quantifiable,
but there is every reason to suspect they could be significant.so
C. The "PoliticalPlus" ofDeliberation-EnhancingReforms
It is always advantageous when reformers can propose
substantively valid changes that are also likely to finesse past practical
political roadblocks. Luckily, this is the case with deliberationenhancing reforms for direct democracy.
Past legislative efforts to reform California's initiative process
have been marred by the perception that they are hostile to direct
democracy or will compromise prerogatives of voters and other
participants in its processes. 5 ' These perceptions should be
49. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 62 (2008) (informal
rulemaking promotes a "better quality of resulting rules" because, inter alia, "all
interested members of the public participate, rather than only the parties to a
particular dispute").
50. Some who seek to reform California's direct democracy emphasize the
current risk that ill-conceived proposals will be adopted. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY BY
INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 97-102; MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 16, at 175

(proposing to "prevent drafting errors and unintended consequences" by requiring
sponsors to submit initiative proposals to "nonpartisan staffers inside the capitol-at
the legislative counsel's office, which would produce the actual legislative language
of any measure that circulates").
51. See Smith & Bailey, supra note 10, at 277-80 (summarizing bases for
gubernatorial vetoes of reform proposals).
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substantially easier to avoid with deliberation-enhancing reforms.
Such reforms can be plausibly positioned as efforts to empower voters
and initiative proponents, thus reinforcing the present system by
making it work better.
This point is best shown by comparing deliberation-enhancing
reforms with the wide variety of past legislative proposals that neither
primarily nor secondarily related to deliberation. Some of the latter
would have significantly altered the dynamics of direct democracy by
raising the gradient for proposing initiatives 52 or qualifying them for
the ballot." Even relatively modest system changes-such as
graduated increases in the fees proponents must pay to submit
initiatives to the Attorney General 54 and requirements that petition
signature gatherers tell voters whether they are being paid or are
public-spirited volunteers 5 5-have been perennially vetoed by several
California governors because of a perception that the reforms seek to
interfere with the prerogatives of initiative proponents. 56
Deliberation-enhancing proposals can substantially avoid these
traps. They take the core procedures of direct democracy as given and
seek to make them work better. As shown in the previous section,
these proposals can deliver real improvements in the way direct
democracy serves voters (by giving them useful information directly
or through cue givers), initiative proponents (by enhancing their
ability to communicate, and secure judicial enforcement of, their
intentions), and other direct-democracy supporters. Advocates of
deliberation-enhancing reforms should be able to translate these real
substantive advances into the language of practical politics,
positioning their proposals as serving transparency, accessibility, and
voter sovereignty. Advocates of deliberation enhancement might even
acquire the political luxury of putting reform opponents in the posture,

52. See, e.g., id. app. D.I.A at 297 (summarizing three proposals tightening
application of the single-subject rule, thus limiting range of proposals).
53. See, e.g., id. app. D.II.C at 299 (summarizing four proposals raising the
percentage of voter signatures required to qualify initiatives).
54. See, e.g., id app. B at 289 (summarizing A.B. 436 and A.B. 1832).
55. See, e.g., id. app. B at 289-90 (summarizing S.B. 1598, S.B. 469, S.B. 725,
S.B. 1219, and S.B. 1979).
56. See id. at 277-80.
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as a state legislator memorably put it to the Working Group, of having
to defend the value of keeping voters in the dark.17
In sum, direct-democracy reformers find themselves in the
enviable position of being able to propose both worthwhile and
politically advantaged changes when they focus on deliberationenhancingreforms for California's direct democracy.
II. WHY THE ADMINISTRA TIVE MODEL?: THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE-RULEMAKING MODEL FOR DELIBERATIONENHANCING REFORM OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

The Working Group Report's proposal draws its inspiration from
the informal notice-and-comment procedures long used by
administrative agencies in California, most other states, and the
federal government to issue legally binding administrative rules.
At first blush, this choice of models might seem odd. After all,
under the traditional rhetoric surrounding direct democracy in
California, the people's right to legislate by initiative is equated to (if
not elevated above) the right of the California Legislature to pass
statutes.5 8
Yet, as Section A of this Part will show, the legislative model is
significantly inapt for conceptualizing the role of voters in
California's direct democracy. The disconnect is especially true with
regard to the relationship of voter-legislators to each other and to other
57. Of course, a pessimist might argue that the momentum of directdemocracy reform inevitably and preclusively belongs to those opposing any change
not liberalizing the current direct-democracy system. See, e.g., id at 285-86. This
pessimistic outlook would render pointless any reform proposal imposing additional
requirements or procedures, even if those additional procedures enhanced the
experience of process participants and made direct democracy work better. This
Article and the Working Group Report reject this view, both because it is a
prescription for resignation and because it is likely contradicted by poll data
showing that, while largely supportive of direct democracy in the abstract,
California voters express substantial sentiments that it can be improved. See infra
Appendix II. pp. 62-64; DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 17.
58. See Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 574 (Cal. 1995) (noting that "[t]he
people's reserved power of initiative is greater than the power of the legislative
body," in that constitutional changes adopted by initiative can bind future
legislatures, unlike prior legislative enactments); Smith, supra note 1, at 261 &
nn. 15-16 (noting that California courts use same interpretive rules for initiatives that
they apply to legislator-passed statutes),
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political actors, the nature of informational resources available to
voters, and the deliberative processes in which they engage (or, more
accurately, do not engage). Rather, as Section B will explain, voters in
the initiative process are much more like legislators delegating power
to expert administrative rulemakers, while reserving the authority to
"veto" the rulemakers' work product.
A. The Inappropriatenessof the Legislative Model in Describing the
Real Role andAuthority of CaliforniaInitiative Voters
Whatever its symbolic value, the orthodox description of
California initiative voters as twice-yearly versions of elected
legislators is significantly inaccurate in three different senses. First, in
contrast to California legislators, who are organized along politicalparty lines and relate in multiple and ongoing ways, California
initiative voters have at best a random relationshipto each other. They
"convene" (albeit only metaphorically) twice a year to cast a series of
votes without any sense of shared political fate or responsibility;
unlike legislators, they are under few, if any, constraints to vote in a
consistent manner (on partisan, ideological, or self-serving grounds)
across the range of initiatives on a particular ballot or across time.
These seemingly obvious observations have less banal
implications. For one thing, California voter-legislators lack the voting
cues elected legislators receive from legislative colleagues to whom
they are related by partisanship or personal experience and trust.
Citizen-legislators are not organized into committees whose members
develop a particular substantive expertise they can then share with
their less expert colleagues, either in the form of presumptively
credible legislative proposals or voting patterns to emulate. This robs
individual voters of the sources of information, policy ideas, and trust
that develop in legislative bodies; voters are correspondingly more
dependent upon cues from others they might trust less. 59
Nor, compared to elected legislators, are voter-legislators
connected in any meaningful way to the "others" upon whom they
must depend for information, expertise, and legislative alternatives.
When elected legislators rely on executive-branch staffers or interest59. Even if legislator interrelationships and opportunities for specialization
and expertise development have declined in the California Legislature in the era of
term limits, major differences in degree still remain.
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group representatives for information, expert judgment, and even
concepts and language for proposed legislation, mutual dependence
and the need to preserve a minimum of trust over time can enhance
good faith and truthfulness. The lobbyist tempted for short-term gain
to provide legislators with incomplete or inaccurate information or
mislead them into taking a position against their interests knows that
this is a highly dangerous maneuver; the lobbyist may be back before
that legislator again, and preserving the legislator's trust is important.
By contrast, most voters will have no ongoing relationship with the
individuals or organizations proposing initiatives and providing
information to encourage them to vote yes. Nor, generally, will voters
have ongoing relationships assuring good faith and truthful dealings
with other individuals and organizations providing information and
expertise while supporting or opposing initiative proposals. 60
A second main difference between voter-legislators and elected
legislators is the fundamentally different information resources they
can command. As any California voter can attest, the privilege of
serving as unpaid legislator twice a year is not accompanied by a
professional staff of consultants, researchers, and other advisors.
Voter-legislators have no subpoena power, no specialized committee
reports or memoranda to guide their understanding of relevant issues,
and cannot convene hearings.61
60. The exception to this observation is when voters have political affiliations
with particular political leaders or are members of particular organizations opining
about the scope or implications of initiative proposals. Even here, though, the bonds
between politicians proposing or opining about initiatives and millions of voters (or
organizations serving as "cue-givers" for those voters) are distinct from the close
bonds between a small group of legislators and the relatively discreet set of nonlegislators participating actively in the legislative process.
61. As Nora Kashani and Robert Stern of the Center for Governmental Studies
put it in a recent article:
The legislature is designed to hold hearings, hear experts detail pertinent
facts, receive expert staff research and analysis, discuss the issue with
people who have opposing opinions and diverse viewpoints, and hear the
views of the general public. Furthermore, legislators get paid to spend
time deliberating. The opposite is true for the voters. Even among citizens
who spend an above-average amount of time deliberating initiatives, the
time the voters devote to studying the measures may still not rise to the
level of deliberation at the legislative level.
Nora Kashani & Robert Stern, Making California's Initiative Process More
Deliberative,47 CAL. W. L. REv. 311, 317 (2011).
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A third difference between elected and unpaid legislators is in
discussion and debate modes. California legislators can negotiate and
offer amendments at various legislative stages to remedy perceived
deficiencies in proposed legislation. They can engage in strategic
delaying tactics to wrangle concessions from proponents and
supporters. Voter-legislators, of course, only cast one yes-or-no vote
on an entire initiative proposal; they cannot engage in strategic delay
and are called upon to vote by election day whether they are
sufficiently informed or not. There is no formal process for
deliberating with their fellow "legislators," and they cannot bargain
with initiative sponsors in any case.
B. The SubstantiallyBetter "Fit"of the
Administrative-RulemakingModel
If voter-legislators were really in the position of elected officials,
but simply without the information resources available to their
"counterparts," one promising direction for reform would be to make
voter information more like that available to elected legislators.
Indeed, reformers in the California Legislature have introduced
several proposals in the last decade to strengthen the current legal
requirement for legislative hearings once initiatives qualify for the

ballot. 62

Interestingly, current law seeks to ease this last deficiency by requiring
legislative committees to hold hearings on every initiative proposal once it qualifies
for an upcoming ballot. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034 (West Supp. 2011). Unfortunately,
selective research done for the Working Group Report several years ago suggests
that these hearings are generally perfunctory, come relatively late in the election
cycle, and are not uniformly easy to access. See infra Appendix II. pp. 76-78. In any
event, the hearings prompted by section 9034 hardly afford voter-legislators the
same ability as elected legislators to influence the questions asked or witnesses
heard at legislative hearings.
62. See, e.g., A.B. 943, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (deadline for
legislative hearings moved up to thirty days before initiative placed on ballot); S.B.
1243, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (transferring responsibility for holding
hearings to Little Hoover Commission); A.B. 1500, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal
2001) (deadline for legislative hearings moved to forty-five days after receipt of
measure); S.B. 384, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (Legislature would hold
hearing thirty days after petition receives fifteen percent of the necessary voter
signatures).
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The Working Group Report and this Article respectfully suggest,
however, that reformers would do well to look at another equally
familiar, yet distinct, analogy: administrative rulemaking. 63 With one
major difference (explored in the last paragraph in this subsection),
voters and initiative sponsors seem to be in an even more
exaggeratedly one-sided version of the dependent relationship that
elected legislators have with administrative lawmakers.
The reasons for the rise of the modem administrative state are
numerous. One central explanation, however, is that because elected
legislators lack the time and expertise to research and craft detailed
laws to serve highly complex policy goals, they delegate their
legislative power to unelected agency rulemakers. 64 With even more
serious time and expertise gaps, California voters make a de facto
delegation of their legislative authority to initiative proponents. In
both cases, the principal "legislators" rely upon the judgment,
knowledge, and public spiritedness of their agents. Indeed, voters are
substantially more reliant; unlike elected legislators, voters are unable
to control initiative sponsors directly on the front end, by setting limits
on the delegated authority they grant in enabling legislation, or
indirectly on the back end, through budgetary, oversight, and other
restraints. And in reacting to their work product, both elected
legislators and voters depend significantly upon information provided
by those to whom they have delegated legislative power. (Here, too,
voter-legislators would appear to be worse off than elected legislators.
As noted earlier, they have even fewer independent informational
resources on which to call.)
Finally, regarding discussion and debate, voter-legislators are in a
fundamentally similar position with respect to initiative sponsors as
63. Professor Glen Staszewski initially noticed the promise of incorporating
administrative deliberative mechanisms into the initiative process. See Glen
Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency
Model to DirectDemocracy, 56 VAND. L. REv. 395, 449 (2003).
64. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("[I]n our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power (to
administrative agencies] under broad general directives."); DONALD D. BARRY &
HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 54

(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 3d ed. 2005) (Congress delegates broad
powers to administrative agencies "because the questions that it is dealing with are
too complex or new").
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elected legislators are to administrative rulemakers. Neither type of
legislator has any special process for meaningful consultation with
those who will develop proposed law changes. Actually, elected
legislators can at least participate in the period for public comment
California's administrative-rulemaking procedures now provide to any
"interested person." 65 At present, voters cannot provide input or
comments to initiative proponents.
In sum, direct democracy seems substantially more analogous to
administrative lawmaking than legislative lawmaking. Directdemocracy reformers would be more appropriately guided, then, by
how California rulemaking procedures structure the provision of
relevant information and the facilitation of appropriate public
discussion.
Admittedly, voter-legislators have one major power advantage
over elected legislators who delegate rulemaking authority to
administrative decisionmakers. Administrative rulemakers can adopt
binding rules with "the force and effect of law" without legislative
approval; 66 elected legislators must take affirmative steps to
counteract the work done by their delegates. 67 Voter-legislators, by
65. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.8 (West 2005).
66. See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 960 P.2d
1031, 1036 (Cal. 1998) ("Because agencies granted . . . substantive rulemaking
power are truly 'making law,' their quasi-legislative rules have the dignity of
statutes.").
67. In addition to the power any legislative body has to amend or rescind
regulations through newly enacted legislation, California legislators have one further
option available for causing the revision or demise of regulations indirectly. Section
11349.7 of the California Government Code establishes a process by which "any
standing, select, or joint committee of the Legislature" can force review of "any
regulation, group of regulations, or series of regulations that the committee believes
does not meet the standards set forth in Section 11349.1 of the Government Code."
(Section 11349.1 requires that adopted regulations meet defined standards of (1)
necessity, (2) authority, (3) clarity, (4) consistency, (5) reference (i.e., whether the
regulation spells out "the statutes, court decisions, or other provisions of law" the
agencies rule is implementing), and (6) nonduplication.) This legislator-initiated
review is conducted by the California Office of Administrative Law, the executivebranch entity with primary authority to review "all regulations adopted, amended, or
repealed pursuant to" California rulemaking procedures. CAL. Gov'T CODE §
11349.1 (West 2005). See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11349 (West 2005)
(establishing standards and procedures for return or approval of regulations,
gubernatorial review of disputed OAL decisions, etc.).
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contrast, can merely stop initiative proponents' plans by refusing to
give their assent. 6 8 This key power difference hardly compensates for
the information and discussion deficits voter-legislators now face in
dealing with the initiative proponents who are the voters' equivalent
of administrative rulemakers; the right to "just say no" at the end of
the process is more of a sledgehammer than a scalpel when the
process fails to provide adequate bases for knowing whether or not to
wield the tool. But, as discussed below in Part III, the ultimate voter
power of negation (and the greater sovereignty it implies) justifies a
cautious approach to which aspects of administrative notice-andcomment procedures should be imported into the direct democracy
context.
III. WHY STREAMLINED INFORMAL RULEMAKING?: THE SUBSTANTIVE
AND POLITICAL RATIONALES FOR SELECTIVITY, AND DESIGN
SPECIFICATIONS FOR ACHIEVING IT

The main conclusion of the previous Part-that administrative
rulemaking is the more accurate model for direct democracysuggests at first blush that the informal notice-and-comment
procedures California now uses for such rulemaking should be
transferred feature-by-feature to the initiative context. In fact, the legal
scholar who deserves credit for first writing about the analogous
qualities of direct democracy and administrative rulemaking leaped to
a variation of this suggestion. 69
The Working Group and this Article propose, however, that only a
significantly streamlined version of California's informal rulemaking
procedures be transferred to the direct-democracy context. For reasons
of both substance and politics, as developed in Part III.A, reformers
should be leery of transferring to the initiative context all of the
extensive analysis requirements, consultation options, and multiple
judicial-review opportunities current administrative-rulemaking

68. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a) (initiative statutes are not effective until
"approved by a majority of voters"); id. at art. XVIII, § 4 (same for initiative
amending state constitution).
69. See Smith, supra note 1, at 296-99 (criticizing Professor Staszewski for
endorsing "an over-elaborate deliberative approach" incorporating all federal
administrative procedures, including "potential multiple rounds ofjudicial review").
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procedures provide. The wiser course would be selective borrowing
under the "design specifications" outlined in Part III.B.
A. Substantive andPoliticalReasons Why Discretionis the Better
Partof Valor
1. The Substantive Casefor Selective Borrowingfrom Administrative
Notice-and-CommentProcedures
Part II's analysis suggests that California's initiative process is
mostly, but not completely, like the administrative-rulemaking
process. For all phases leading up to final voting-that is, from
developing proposals through amassing information and discussing
administrative
resembles
process
initiative
proposals-the
more
anything,
if
are,
rulemaking; the legislative "principals" (voters)
reliant on the judgment, expertise, and goodwill of their de facto
agents (initiative proponents). At the stage of giving final binding
assent, however, the initiative process shifts to resemble lawmaking
by elected legislators; in both processes, proposals to change the status
quo do not become law until affirmatively approved by majority vote.
The best model for representing the initiative process, therefore,
seems to be a "hybrid" based mainly on administrative rulemaking,
but recognizing the one key similarity to lawmaking by elected
legislators.
This hybrid model suggests that the best mix of procedures for
bringing more deliberation to California's direct democracy is
somewhere toward the middle of the procedural continuum between
administrative rulemaking and lawmaking by elected legislators. The
most apt candidates for borrowing are administrative-rulemaking
procedures most directly affording useful information and
opportunities for discussion about proposed law changes; these are the
rulemaking procedures most empowering for voters when they
ultimately act like elected legislators voting on legislation.
Recognizing the one way voters are like legislators adopting
legislation, rather than legislators deferring to administrative
rulemakers-that is, recognizing voters' ultimate sovereignty to cast
final yes or no votes on initiatives-suggests, however, that reformers
should not transfer other aspects of California's current rulemaking
process to the initiative process. Specifically:
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a. Reformers should avoid carrying over into the initiative
context information-gatheringand analysis requirements designed to
constrain the substantive discretion of administrative rulemakers.
Current California rulemaking procedures include a number of
analytical requirements designed to prevent, or at least dissuade,
administrative rulemakers from proposing or adopting certain kinds of
rules. For example, current law requires an agency rule proponent to
explain why alternative approaches would not "be more effective in
carrying out" the agency's purpose or "as effective and less
burdensome."7 0
Information-gathering and analytical requirements make sense for
a system in which an administrative agency's assent usually
substitutes for ultimate approval by legislators. For example, if elected
legislators will not themselves be considering the costs and benefits of
proposed rules and the alternatives-or legislators will only do this
later in a very different context-it makes sense to require that the
substitute (administrative) decision-makers perform the desired
analysis and defend its validity. On the other hand, because the
initiative process assumes that voters will ultimately weigh costs and
benefits (or rely on cues from those who have done this analysis),
requiring proponents to conclusively determine that benefits outweigh
costs is substantively presumptuous.
b. Reformers should avoid carrying over into the initiative
context onerous requirementsfor judicial review (including ancillary
information-gatheringand record-developing procedures to support
judicialreview). California provides multiple opportunities for judicial
review at several phases of administrative rulemaking; the state's
courts may be called upon to determine:
* whether administrative rulemakers "substantially failed" to
comply with any of the several notice-and-comment
procedures the California Government Code requires for
rulemaking;

70. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.5(a)(13) (West 2005); see infra text
accompanying note 89. Current administrative-rulemaking procedures also impose
other information-gathering and analysis requirements relating to required
technology or equipment; rejected reasonable alternatives; and economic impacts on
business generally, small business specifically, employment, housing, state and local
governmental units, and school districts. See infra text accompanying notes 90-96.
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* whether administrative rulemakers have "substantial
evidence" to back up their determinations that regulations
are "reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
provision[s] of law being implemented"; and
* whether administrative rulemaker declarations that
regulations "will not have a significant adverse economic
impact on business enterprises" fly in the face of
"substantial evidence in the record." 7
In general, it is not substantively appropriate to impose these
judicial-review provisions on the initiative process. 72 First, as with the
information-gathering and analysis requirements discussed above,
judicial review generally compensates for the reality that rulemaking
proposals become law without affirmative legislator assent. Judicial
oversight seeks to make up for the general inability of legislators to
notice and react to departures from required procedures or minimal
rationality. Just as it did for many requirements for information
gathering and analysis, the ultimate role of voter-legislators in
granting or withholding final assent makes it inappropriate to graft
extensive judicial-review requirements onto the initiative process.7 3
A second reason for caution in importing judicial review into
reforms designed to promote initiative-process deliberation is that in
the administrative context it has shown a tendency to substantially
slow the process, delaying regulation and imposing costs on system
participants. 74 Delaying the adoption of administrative regulations by
71. 9 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS § 144
(5th ed. 2010).
72. Thus, although litigation over the adequacy of compliance with noticeand-comment procedures would not be judicially enforceable, the Working Group
Report proposal does provide that minimal compliance with notice-and-comment
procedures would be a judicially enforceable prerequisite to public officials taking
further actions to prepare an initiative proposal for voter signature. See infra text
accompanying notes 125-3 1.
73. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & ScoTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING:- How
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 55 (4th ed. 2010) (judicial
review of rulemaking was the "substitute for the accountability fostered by the ballot
box").
74. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 168 (2d ed. 2008)
("The APA's basic rulemaking procedure ... was intended to be a simple and
flexible process, although in practice it is often unwieldy and cumbersome.");
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 341 (5th ed.
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administrative agents, especially when existing laws already provide a
measure of public protection, is quite different from delaying the
consideration and adoption of laws by legislative principals
themselves (i.e., voters considering initiative proposals). This is
especially true given that judicial review is generally not available for
alleged failures to follow internal procedures of the California
Legislature.7 s
2. The PoliticalReasonsfor Selectivity
Even if there weren't persuasive substantive reasons for it,
selectivity would be justified on important political grounds. As noted
earlier, 76 reform proposals have a real leg up if they can be validly
portrayed as not undermining-and better yet, as actually
enhancing-the initiative process. Proposals too easily characterized
as imposing time-consuming and vexatious barriers run a real risk of
being perceived as anti-initiative overkill. Ambitious judicial review
seems especially problematic; it too easily raises the specter of
litigation tying up the sacred right of the people in judicial
courtrooms.

2009) ("Excessively demanding judicial review has slowed the pace of rulemaking
at all agencies .

.

. and even caused some major agencies to abandon rulemaking

entirely.").
75. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a) ("Each house shall ... adopt rules for
its own proceedings."); People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr.
640, 642-43 (Ct. App. 1986) (construing CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 7 and stating the
"deeply rooted" principle that "the power of a legislative body to govern its own
internal workings has been viewed as essential to its functioning except as it may
have been expressly constrained by [other constitutional provisions]" (emphasis
added)). But see WrrIN, supra note 71, § 9(5) (summarizing section 9031 of the
California Government Code, which empowers any "interested person [to]
commence an action by mandamus, injunction, or declaratory relief for the purpose
of stopping or preventing violations or threatened violations of [California
legislative open-meeting laws] by members of the Legislature").
76. See supra Part I.C.
77. See, e.g., Smith & Bailey, supra note 10, at 268-70.
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B. Design Specificationsfor a Streamlined Version ofNotice-andComment Proceduresfor the CaliforniaInitiative Process
This discussion of substantive and political reasons for selectivity
suggests that initiative reform is truly an area in which "less is more."
This, in turn, points to three "design specifications" (with two
"corollaries" for one of the specifications) that should guide
deliberation-focused reform of the California initiative process:
Specification 1: Impose the Minimum Procedures Necessary to
Achieve Meaningful Information and Discussion. This specification
flows directly from the considerations discussed in Subpart A. There
are both substantive and political advantages in being selective in
borrowing from California's existing provisions for notice-andcomment. Specifically, the needed selectivity should fulfill these two
important corollaries:
Corollary IA: Focus on Current Notice-and-Comment
Procedures Most Directly Providing Useful Information
and Opportunities for Public Discussion, While
Avoiding InappropriateInformation-Gatheringand Analysis
Requirements.
Corollary 1B: Avoid Inappropriate Judicial-Review
Provisions.
Specification 1 also recognizes that adoption of any real
deliberative reform for California's initiative process would be an
unprecedented development. As with most "first efforts," initial
caution may be warranted. Especially where, as in the initiativereform context, reformers and their suggested changes may be greeted
with substantial skepticism, it may be prudent to take partial steps
initially. The initial changes can then be expanded as experience
indicates and as system participants become comfortable with the new
system.
Specification 2: Hew as Closely as Possible to Existing Statutory
Language and "Precedents." As a general matter, reformers who can
copy existing statutory formulations and time-tested approaches to
achieve their intended improvements are strategically ahead of the
game. This eases concerns about the workability of reforms and any
unintended consequences.
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The current iteration of California rulemaking procedures has
been around for over thirty years. 78 They have a well-established track
record of workability. They are highly familiar to legislators, other
public officials, and other participants in the California legal and
political systems considering rulemaking-based reform proposals.
Specification 3: Only Add New Requirements When Necessary to
Solve Clearly Identified Problems Plaguing the Initiative Process
(Including,Especially, Subsequent Initiatory Construction). Limiting
innovations to those clearly aimed at solving demonstrated problems
will keep reforms focused on substantively necessary improvements
and defuse political concerns. Eliminating past problems with
initiatory construction can garner support among initiative proponents
by offering them greater confidence that their strategic intent will be
more likely to prevail in court.
IV. WHY THIS PROPOSAL'S SPECIFIC CHOICES? HOW THE WORKING
GROUP PROPOSAL ENHANCES DELIBERATION IN A SELECTIVE MANNER
CONSISTENT WITH THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES

The previous Parts established a context for appreciating the
major design choices reflected in the proposed reform legislation
endorsed by the Working Group. 79 This Part comments on key
features, explaining how the proposed legislation follows the
specifications just identified as it would (a) require initiative
proponents to draft an initial notice explaining key proposal features
and implications; (b) create an orderly and efficient process for public
comment on the proposal; (c) obligate proponents to respond
efficiently but meaningfully in a final notice to issues raised during
the comment period; and (d) signal to California courts that they
should not review the details of compliance with the new
requirements, but should make appropriate use of the legislative
history created when engaging in subsequent "initiatory construction."

78. See WITKIN,supra note 71, § 38(1) (current rulemaking provisions, "which
are much broader in scope" than procedures originally adopted in 1945, were
adopted in 1979).
79. See infra Appendix I. pp. 56-59 (providing the full text of the Working
Group's proposed legislation).
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A. Notice ofProposedInitiativeLawmaking
Subsection (a) of proposed legislation endorsed by the Working
Group would require initiative proponents, as a prerequisite to
commencing the present process for submitting an initiative proposal
for voter-petition signatures, to submit to the California Secretary of
State a "notice of proposed initiative lawmaking." Implementing
Design Specification 2 (the guideline to follow existing law as closely
as possible), our proposal would adopt verbatim or only slightly
modify the existing statutory language guiding administrative agency
notices of proposed rulemaking. Implementing Design Specification
1, the proposed section focuses on the core information voters and
their cue givers need.
A brief description of how the proposal would do this is as
follows:
* Subsection (a)(1) would require initiative proponents to include
"the express terms of the proposed measure, including an
addendum using underline, italics, or strikeout to indicate how
the measure would add to, or delete from, current provisions in
the Constitution or laws of this state." This language adapts a
provision requiring administrative rule proponents to explain
how they would change their relevant level of current lawthe California Code of Regulations.8 0
* Subsection (a)(2) would require proponents to provide "[a]n
informative digest drafted in plain English in a format similar
to the Legislative Counsel's digest on legislative bills."" This
verbatim lifting of Government Code section 11346.5(a)(3)
draws a direct parallel between voter-legislators and elected
legislators, which as noted earlier is justified substantively and
politically.
* Subsection (a)(2)(A) would obligate proponents to provide a
"concise and clear summary of existing constitutional
provisions, laws, regulations, and judicial decisions, if any,
related directly to the proposed action" and its "effect" on
those sources of law. This slight adaptation of a current

80. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.2(a)(3) (West Supp. 2011).
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.5(a)(3) (West 2005).
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rulemaking notice requirement82 reflects the broader legal
canvas on which initiative proponents paint. This proposed
Subpart also implements Design Specification 3 (which limits
innovations to those necessary to solve clearly identified
problems, especially those plaguing initiatory construction).
The subsection addresses the leading cause of difficulty when
adopted initiatives are construed in later litigation-how
initiatives interact with the existing legal status quo. 83
* Subsection (a)(2)(B) mirrors the way California law causes
rulemaking proponents to explain the intent behind their
proposals. The proposed subsection would require proponents
to provide a "policy statement overview explaining the broad
objectives of the proposed measure and, if appropriate, the
specific objectives."84
* Subsection (a)(2)(C) implements Design Specification 3 by
adding language directly addressing another cause of
confusion in initiatory construction." Again using the "concise
and clear summary" term of art in current rulemaking
provisions, this subsection would prompt disclosure of "how
the particular sections, subsections, and provisions of the
proposed measure are intended to operate together, including
the intended effect of any provisos, exceptions, or other
modifying clauses."
* Subsection (a)(2)(D) would encourage proponents to include
"any other information which in the[ir] judgment .. . could
82. Id. § 11346.5(a)(3)(A) ("A concise and clear summary of existing laws and
regulations, if any, related directly to the proposed action and of the effect of the
proposed action.").
83. See infra Appendix II. pp. 82-84 tbl. 1 (collecting California cases and
showing that five addressed how initiatives interacted with California constitutional
provisions, twenty-three dealt with initiative interaction with other California
statutes, six required squaring adopted initiatives with prior California judicial
decisions, and five probed the effect of the initiative at issue on other ballot
propositions).
84. GOV'T § 11346.5(a)(3)(C).
85. Many of the several dozen California cases addressing how adopted
initiatives affect criminal and civil litigants, see infra Appendix II. pp. 83-84 tbl.1
(last two categories of collected cases), turned in part on the interaction of different
provisions in the initiative at issue.
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assist interested persons in understanding the justification for,
and intended effect of, the proposed measure." This provision
has no exact counterpart in current rulemaking-notice
requirements.8 6 Its inclusion, however, reflects the strategic
focus on Design Specification 1 (to focus on facilitating useful
information in a minimalist way). The catchall phrase
encouraging further information compensates for many of the
specific information and analysis requirements California law
requires of administrative rulemaking proponents, which (as
explained immediately below) we omit.
* Besides a disclosure to facilitate the public-comment period we
also propose,8 7 the only other requirement for the initial notice
(included in proposed subsection (a)(4)) would be a slight
adaptation of a current rulemaking provision ensuring that
readers of the notice have the "name and telephone number" of
a representative to contact for follow-up inquiries.8 8
Our proposed adaptation of current rulemaking-notice
requirements is as important for what it does not borrow. Consistent
with Corollary lA (focusing on current rulemaking procedures "most
directly" enhancing information and promoting later public
discussion), we would not impose on initiative proponents the current
legal requirement that agency rule advocates state affirmatively that
"no reasonable alternative considered by the agency or that has been
otherwise identified ... would be more effective in carrying out the
purpose [of the proposal] or would be as effective and less
burdensome to affected private persons than the proposed action."89
This provision attempts to hold proponents to a cheapest-effectivealternative standard, thus restricting the substantive discretion of
proponents in a manner inappropriate for the initiative context.

86. Proposed subsection (a)(2)(D) does have a passing resemblance to section
11346.5(a)(4) of the California Government Code, which requires notice of
proposed rulemaking to discuss "[a]ny other matters as are prescribed by statute
applicable to the specific state agency or to any specific regulation or class of
regulations."
87. Proposed subsection (a)(3). See infra Appendix I. p. 57.
88. Gov'T § 11346.5(a)(1 4 ).
89. Id. § 11346.5(a)(13).
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Corollary lA also requires us to leave on the cutting room floor a
number of less overtly directive mandates, such as requirements to
study and disclose why "specific technologies or equipment" are
required; 90 why "reasonable alternatives" have been rejected;91 what
"facts, evidence, documents, testimony, or other evidence" convinced
the agency that the proposed rule "will not have a significant adverse
economic impact on business" generally, 92 on small business
particularly, 93 and on job availability, business creation, and
expansion; 94 how the proposal would affect housing costs; 95 and what
its fiscal implications would be on state and local governmental units
and school districts. 96 All of these requirements could be interesting
and useful in considering particular initiative proposals, but it would
be substantively illegitimate and politically unwise to impose them
generically, for the reasons identified in Part III.
Corollary IB (which generally urges the avoidance of
administrative-law-style judicial review) inspires us to omit
disclosures seemingly imposed on administrators to assist when their
rules end up in court. For example, we would eschew requirements
apparently designed to facilitate judicial review of a rule's substantive
validity-such as obligations to disclose "each technological,
theoretical, and empirical study" relied on by rule proponents in
drafting their proposal or after initially disclosing it. 97 Corollary IB
also recommends that we not carry forward a complicated statutory
section requiring the maintenance of an extensive official "file"
cataloguing all relevant documents.9 8

90. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011).
91. Id. § 11346.2(b)(3)(A).
92. Id. § 11346.2(b)(4).
93. Id. § 11346.2(b)(3)(B).
94. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.3(b) (West 2005). See generally id. § 11346.3
(requiring study of other business costs and economic impacts). Other disclosures
designed to prompt agencies to quantify and minimize impacts on businesses, which
we omitted, are included at section 11346.5(a)(7)-(9) of the California Government
Code.
95. Gov'T § 11346.5(a)(12).
96. Id. § 11346.5(a)(5)-(6).
97. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11346.2(b), 11347.1 (West 2005).
98. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11347.3 (West 2005).
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As to the methods by which the initial notice is provided (as we
address in subsection (b) of our proposal), we honor Design
Specification 2 (that is, the recommendation to stick closely to
existing statutory language) by hewing closely to the major methods
California currently uses for initial notices of proposed rules.
Specifically, each subsection of our proposal mimics a particular
aspect of the statute governing California rulemaking:
* Subsection (b)(1)(A): Notice would be posted on the relevant
state agency's website. 99 (In the initiative context, this is the
Secretary of State's website, which already is a source of
useful information about the initiative process generally and
specific proposals submitted for voter signature or qualified for
the ballot.)..o
* Subsection (b)(1)(B): Notice would be mailed (or, as an added
gesture to current technology, emailed) to any person filing a
request for notices generally, or for notice from particular
proponents or concerning particular subject areas.' 0 1
* Subsection (b)(1)(C): The relevant governmental official (here,
again, the Secretary of State) could, when judged

99. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § I l346.4(a)(6) (West 2005).
100. The "Ballot Measures" subsection of the "Elections" section of Secretary
of State's website provides extensive and readily accessible information on qualified
ballot measures; initiative proposals at varying stages of the circulation process;
initiative proposals pending at the Attorney General's Office, awaiting official titles
and summaries; a "How-To" guide for qualifying an initiative; a resources-andhistorical-information guide pointing searchers to initiative-databases maintained by
other institutions; and a collection of past ballot pamphlets (in .pdf file form). See
CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections-j.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011).
101. The current rulemaking provision requires that notice be "[m]ailed to
every person who has filed a request for notice of regulatory actions with the state
agency." Gov'T § 11346.4(a)(1). We logically make the Secretary of State the
agency for fielding such requests. Just as current rulemaking provisions allow the
requestor to choose "all proposed regulatory actions" of an agency or "one or more"
of its "particular programs," id., we allow a choice between all proposals "authored
by particular proponents" or proposals "concerning particular subject matter areas."
We also allow gluttons for punishment to choose to receive notices of all proposed
initiatives. See id.
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''appropriate," mail or email notices to "any person or group of
persons" believed to be "interested" in the proposal.1 02
The proposal endorsed by the Working Group also includes (in
proposed subsection (b)(1)(D)) a catchall provision that would allow
the Secretary to "[t]ake other actions which in the judgment of the
Secretary will ensure appropriate notice for interested persons."1 03
B. An Informal Public Comment Period
To establish a "meaningful yet manageable structure by which
interested parties can discuss the initiative proposals"' 04 -and to
follow Design Specification 2-subsection (c) of our proposal is
closely modeled after the current provisions governing public
comments and hearings on rulemaking proposals. Specifically:
* Subsection (c)(1) would describe the minimum public-comment
opportunity as the option to submit "statements, arguments, or
contentions in writing."o105

102. Id. § 11346.4(a)(4).
103. This is in lieu of other more specific and extensive requirements to give
notice to specialized audiences, such as directors of governmental departments, see
id. § 11346.4(a)(2), or representatives of small businesses likely to be affected, see
id. § 11346.4(a)(3), and to engage in consultations with regulated parties before
issuing notices for proposals that "involve complex proposals," CAL Gov'T CODE §
11346.45 (West 2005). We omitted these provisions per Design Specification 1
because they seemed to respond to specialized administrative-rulemaking problems
or to go further than the minimal notice requirements necessary to achieve the
Working Group's intention to cause "initiative sponsors to communicate more fully
with the public about their legislative intent." See infra Appendix II. p. 61. (We
omitted several other sections transparently irrelevant to the initiative process, such
as a requirement to publish notices in the California Regulatory Notice Register and
a requirement that notices be reissued after the passage of one year. Gov'T §
11346.4(a)(5), (b).)
As the Working Group Report notes, "it is likely that many initiative
sponsors and other organizations interested in voter education would place the
notice (or links to the Secretary of State's website) on their own websites." See infra
Appendix II. p. 89. Thus, others outside government may end up, as a practical
matter, helping with the goal of our proposed subsection (b)(1)(D) to "ensure
appropriate notice for interested persons." See infra Appendix I. p. 57.
104. See infra Appendix II. p. 61.
105. See infra Appendix I. p. 57.
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* The comment period provided by subsection (c)(1) would be a
forty-five-day comment period.106
* Subsection (c)(2) would leave the decision about whether to
have a public hearing, or to rely merely on written comments,
to the discretion of the proponent. 0 7
* Subsection (c)(2) would also give the official convener of any
public hearing the standard authority to "impose reasonable
limitations on oral presentations." 0 8
Departing from the administrative rulemaking process, in which
the proponent of a law change also runs the comment process, we
propose to make the Secretary of State, rather than initiative
proponents, responsible for administering the comment and (if
requested) hearing processes for initiatives. This would mean that the
Secretary, as part of distributing initial notices of proposed initiative
lawmaking,' 09 would "notifly] recipients of the time, place, and
nature" of comment opportunities for proposed initiatives. 110 The
Secretary would also be responsible for "promptly" and "prominently"
posting and "appropriately indexing" the public comments on the
official website,"1 ' and for "arrang[ing] for, and promptly post[ing] on
106. Current rulemaking provisions describe a public comment period of "[a]t
least 45 days." See Gov'T §§ 11346.4(a), 11346.8(a) (referencing forty-five day
period of section 11346.4(a) in setting forth agency public comment
responsibilities). But, unlike the administrative rulemaking context, the party
running the comment period for proposed initiatives (i.e., the Secretary of State) is
not the proponent; it is therefore inappropriate to give the Secretary the option of
extending the comment period or "continuing or postponing" the hearing, as section
11346.8(b) permits agencies proposing rules to do.
107. The analogous rulemaking provision is section 11346.8(a). Under
subsection (a)(3) of the proposed legislation endorsed by the Working Group, a
proponent would indicate in the notice of proposed initiative lawmaking whether it
"requests that a public hearing be held on the proposed measure." See infra
Appendix I. p. 57.
108. Gov'T § 11346.8(a).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
110. Subsection (b)(2) of the Working Group proposal includes this duty. See
infra Appendix I. p. 57.
111. This obligation is imposed by our proposed subsection (c)(1). See infra
Appendix I. p. 57. The proposed Secretary of State role is similar to, but much
narrower than, the obligation California rulemaking requirements place on
administrative agencies to include "[a]n index or table of contents that identifies
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the Secretary's official website, a transcript or recording of [any]
public hearing."" 2
Proposing to involve the Secretary of State in these ways seems
appropriate to the Secretary's official role as a neutral supervisor of
the initiative process;"' it also avoids imposing additional expense
and bother on initiative proponents.'14

each item contained" in a comprehensive "rulemaking file." CAL. Gov'T CODE §
11347.3(b)(12) (West 2005). Current rulemaking provisions require this rulemaking
file to include twelve categories of information. See id. § 11347.3(b).
112. We state this responsibility in our proposed subsection (c)(2). See infra
Appendix I. pp. 57-58.
113. California election law assigns these official duties related to the
initiative process to the Secretary of State: supervising signature-gatherer
compliance with relevant deadlines; conducting a raw count of signatures to
determine whether the number of valid voter signatures has met the statutory
minimum (or whether random-sample verification should be conducted by county
election officials); certifying initiative proposals for the ballot, including sending
copies of the text of ballot-qualified initiatives to the California State Senate and
California Assembly, triggering statutory requirements to conduct legislative
hearings on the proposals; compiling initiative-proposal texts, Legislative Analyst
summaries and explanations, and proponent and opponent statements for the ballot
pamphlet; and supervising voting on initiatives and certifying results. See Statewide
Initiative Guide, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballotmeasures/initiative-guide.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). In addition, as already
noted, the Secretary of State's website includes several sections designed to enhance
public knowledge about the initiative process and particular initiative proposals. See
supra note 100.
The Working Group's reform proposal would not be the first to place
obligations on the Secretary of State. See, e.g., S.B. 1764, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1998) (changed California law to require the Secretary of State to make
ballot initiatives and voter pamphlets available online); A.B. 2584, 2007-2008 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) (would have made the Secretary of State a real-party-ininterest in litigation over ballots or ballot pamphlets related to initiatives); A.B. 677,
1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (would have authorized the Secretary of
State to choose a panel of three retired appellate state judges to give non-binding
advisory opinions, to appear in the ballot pamphlet, on whether ballot-qualified
initiatives are consistent with state and federal constitutional requirements).
114. To further advance the overall effort to present a streamlined version of a
comment period and avoid a politically adverse perception of overkill, we omit
provisions allowing participants at public hearings to be placed under oath. See CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 11346.8(b) (West 2005).
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C. A FinalNotice Responding to Public Comments
The last major phase in California's informal notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures is a requirement that an agency issue a "final
notice" to update information it provided in the initial notice of
proposed rulemaking and respond to the information and positions
received during the comment period. The update requirement provides
interested persons with the latest version of the agency's planned
changes in the legal status quo and its most definitive thinking about
the impact of and rationale for the change. The requirement to respond
to comments seeks to ensure that the agency has considered the merits
of the comments; this assures an authentic deliberative give-and-take,
rather than a one-way flow of information followed by agency
proponents responding with the equivalent of "Thank you for sharing.
Now we'll just do what we planned anyway."
The Working Group proposal seeks to prompt initiative
proponents to perform these update and response functions in an
appropriately streamlined way. Our proposed subsection (d) would
prompt a "final notice of proposed initiative lawmaking" with three
components:
* Subsection (d)(1) would require proponents to provide "the
most recent version of the express terms" of their proposal,
using the same method they used in the initial notice to
indicate how they now propose to change current California
Constitution and statutory provisions." 5
* Subsection (d)(2) adapts with minor changes a current
California rulemaking provision requiring that proponents
provide "[a]n update of the information contained in the initial
[justification for the proposal]."' 1 6
* Subsection (d)(3) copies, with only minimal word changes, a
current rulemaking requirement that the proponent summarize
"each objection or recommendation made" about the initial
proposal and explain how the proposal "has been changed to

115. If the proposed initiative has not changed since the initial notice, the
proponent will simply copy and paste the text and explanation from that initial
notice.
116. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.9(a)(1) (West 2005).
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accommodate each objection or recommendation.""' In so
doing, subsection (d)(3) also carries forward in virtually
the
making
procedures
current
verbiage
identical
summarization and explanation requirement more manageable;
our proposed subsection would allow proponents to "aggregate
repetitive comments" and respond to them "as a group," and to
do the same for "irrelevant" or non-specific comments (or
even "dismiss them" as a group)."'
Admittedly, the requirements of this last subsection are the most
ambitious requirements of our proposal-in terms of the effort and
potential expense they would require from proponents. However, there
seems to be no other time-tested procedure for structuring proponent
response; these requirements appear to be the minimum prerequisites
for promoting meaningful discussion, thus meeting Design
Specification 1. At least the proposal avoids other more onerous
requirements-including a prohibition effectively requiring agencies
substantially changing rulemaking proposals in response to public
comments to seek additional public comment,"l 9 and requirements that
final notices justify mandates on local agencies or school districts,' 20
explain selection of any alternatives other than the most cost-effective
ones, 12 1 and defend rejection of any alternatives with lesser impacts on

small businesses.122

117. Id. § 11346.9(a)(3).
118. Id.
119. Gov'T § 11346.8(c) ("No state agency may adopt, amend, or repeal a
regulation which has been changed from [the original proposal], unless the change is
(1) nonsubstantial or solely grammatical in nature, or (2) sufficiently related to the
original text that the public was adequately placed on notice that the change could
result from the originally proposed regulatory action. If a sufficiently related change
is made, the full text of the [changed proposal], with the change clearly indicated,
shall be made available to the public for at least 15 days .... Any written comments
received regarding the change must be responded to in the final statement [on the
rule].").
120. See Gov'T § 11346.9(a)(2).
121. See id. § 11346.9(a)(4).
122. See id. § 11346.9(a)(5).
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D. AppropriatelyModest Guidance to CaliforniaJudges
As explained earlier, the Working Group decided that it would be
desirable to send two messages to California's courts. First, the
proposal would instruct state jurists to ensure basic compliance with
the new notice-and-comment requirements, while avoiding the
onerous judicial review that can slow down and needlessly formalize
administrative rulemaking. 123 Second, although courts would continue
to use "the intention of the voters" as the basic touchstone for
interpreting the scope and meaning of voter-passed initiatives, the
proposal would require them to give "appropriate consideration" to
relevant indicators developed during the new notice-and-comment

process.124
In seeking to limit judicial review of the new notice-and-comment
procedures it creates-thereby avoiding the substantive and political
problems identified earlierl 2 5 -new subsection (f)(1) would add to the
Elections Code a statement that "[c]ompliance or noncompliance with
the provisions of this section" is not generally reviewable in court. 2 6
Expanding a narrower judicial-review preclusion used for a portion of
the California rulemaking process,127 subsection (f)(1) would provide
that no provision of the Working Group proposal "shall ... be
construed in any manner that results in the invalidation of an initiative
lawmaking measure because of the alleged inadequacy of the content
of the initial or final notices. ,,128
Thus, as long as proponents submitted the required notices and the
Secretary follows her statutory duty to provide a forty-five day
123. See infra Appendix II. pp. 91-92.
124. See infra Appendix II. pp. 92-93.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
126. See infra Appendix I. p. 59.
127. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.5(c) (West 2005) (providing that
requirements for the notice of proposed rulemaking "shall not be construed in any
manner that results in the invalidation of a regulation because of the alleged
inadequacy of the notice content or the summary of cost estimates, or the alleged
inadequacy or inaccuracy of the housing cost estimates, if there has been substantial
compliance with those requirements" (emphasis added)). The Working Group's
hesitancy to impose even a "substantial compliance" or similar threshold for
precluding judicial review reflects Design Specification l's warning to "impose the
minimum procedures necessary" while avoiding "inappropriate" judicial review.
128. See infra Appendix I. p. 59.
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comment period to interested persons, proponents and their supporters
would not have to worry that opponents could bring vexatious
lawsuits disputing the adequacy of compliance to tie proponents'
hands. The intention here is not to permit wholesale flouting of
statutory requirements. Indeed, new subsection (f)(1) would
specifically make submission of notices and affording of the comment
period prerequisites to later stages of initiative qualification.129 And as
the Working Group Report notes, we envision that "appropriate legal
authorities," such as the Secretary of State and the California Attorney
General would not further process initiative proposals if proponents
flatly failed to file required notices. 130 The Report notes: "As with all
failures of governmental authorities to follow statutory requirements,
the failure of governmental authorities to withhold cooperation from
non-participating initiative proponents would to this limited extent be
subject to judicial correction. "131
Still, the Working Group found it substantively and politically
preferable to rely mainly on "natural incentives" of a non-judicial
nature. 132 For example, "[p]roactive sponsors would naturally seek to
listen to interested parties and engage with them in real discussions
about eventual consequences of initiatives; sponsors would have a
natural incentive to respond to comments and refine initiatives in an
effort to get voter support."' 33 By contrast, "[s]ponsors who ignored
valid public comments would worry that they would be admitting the
truth of the comments and that this could affect them adversely in the
court of public opinion and in courts of law (when the meaning and
application of initiatives are at issue)."1 34 The presence of cue givers,
including the media, to call attention to sponsors failing to engage in

129. The specific language would read: "A proposed initiative measure may
not be submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to Section 9002 or subsequently
circulated for voter signatures under the provisions of this Code until the initial and
final notices required by subsections (a) and (d) are submitted to the Secretary and
until the comment period required by subsection (c) is provided." See infra
Appendix I. p. 59.
130. See infra Appendix 1I. p. 91 n.90.
131. See infra Appendix II. p. 91 n.90.
132. See infra Appendix II. p. 90.
133. See infra Appendix II. p. 90.
134. See infra Appendix II. p. 90.
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good faith in notice-and-comment processes should provide
substantial compliance incentives even without judicial enforcers.
In prompting judicial initiatory construers to give "appropriate
consideration" to the fruits of the notice-and-comment process, the
proposal would add a new paragraph to section 1859 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure, which addresses "[c]onstruction of statutes
or instruments."l 3 5 Mimicking exactly how that section commands
that statutory construction effect "the intention of the Legislature," our
proposed section 1859.1 would provide that "[i]n the construction of a
law enacted by voter initiative, the intention of the voters is to be
pursued, if possible." 36 Recognizing the essential truth, however, that
voters place significant reliance on the authoritative intentions of
initiative proponents, proposed section 1859.1 goes on to provide that
in ascertaining such intent appropriate consideration shall be given
to the intentions of proponents as expressed in the initial and final
notices of proposed initiative lawmaking. . . , including how final
notices respond or fail to respond to statements, arguments or
contentions made by interested persons during the [forty-five-day]
comment period. 137
This proposed new paragraph would achieve Design Specification
3 by adding a new requirement "necessary to solve clearly identified
problems plaguing the initiative process (including, especially, the
subsequent initiatory construction)."13 8 My previous article, the
various scholarly works it commented upon, and the Working Group
Report all noted the high degree of artificiality in the current judicial
approach to initiatory construction.1 39 Courts too often naively
attribute a sophisticated and nuanced intent to voters; primarily they
unrealistically assume their familiarity with sophisticated canons of
statutory construction and consult a limited and generally
unenlightening range of official ballot-pamphlet materials. Because
the Working Group proposal would create an authoritative,
transparent, and reliable record of sponsor intentions-intentions
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1859 (West 2003).

See infra Appendix I. p. 59.
See infra Appendix I. p. 59.
See supra pp. 32-33.
See Smith, supra note 1, at 263-67; see infra Appendix II. pp. 79-80.
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perfected in the crucible of a public-comment process-it makes
abundant sense to require courts to give it "appropriate consideration."
Specifically, proposed section 1859.1 is written to remedy the clearly
identified problem of initiatory-construction courts treating statements
of supporters and opponents equally (in contrast to the standard
practice in statutory construction of giving greater weight to views of
supporters, and especially sponsors). 140 Comments made by interested
persons during the official comment period would be relevant to
fathoming initiative application not in their own right, but in light of
how proponents "respond or fail to respond" to them.
V. WHAT STRATEGIC QUESTIONS REMAIN ON THE WAY TO PROPOSAL
ENACTMENT? QUESTIONS OF SCOPE, TIMING, PHASE-IN, AND METHOD
OF ADOPTION

The previous Part analyzed the final version of proposed
legislation emerging from Working Group deliberations. As with any
proposal, the deliberations leading up to it considered strategic
questions and alternatives not fully reflected in the final product. Now,
the passage of time and further consideration leads me to see several
questions and alternatives as more worthy of comment than the
original Working Group assumed.
It is fitting, then, to close analysis of the Working Group proposal
by considering four strategic questions:
1. Can the MajorAspects of the Proposalbe Severed
and Adopted One at a Time?
For various practical reasons, reformers often have to ask whether
a partial loaf is better than none. Thus, although the Working Group
believes that its proposal provides an appropriately comprehensive
and measured way to significantly enhance the deliberation of
California's direct democracy, the question remains whether adopting
the proposal piecemeal would be better than doing nothing.
I believe the answer is an emphatic yes. If "all" the first round of
reform did was spur initiative proponents to think more systematically
about the rationale for and effect of their contemplated legal
changes-and to provide better notice about that to voters, their cue
140. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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givers, and judicial construers-this would be a major advance.
Alternatively, if reformers were reluctant on substantive (or, more
likely, political) grounds to impose additional disclosure requirements
on proponents, "merely" providing a forum for discussing proposed
initiatives so that others could meaningfully consider their pros and
cons and identify likely effects, to the enlightenment of voters and cue
givers, would also be a real improvement over the present system. In
fact, the 2003 passage of Representative Laird's A.B. 1245 in both
houses of the California Legislaturel41 suggests the importance and
viability under different political circumstances of a reform proposal
providing a public-hearing opportunity alone.
Of course, neither adopting notice nor providing for comment by
itself would be as satisfactory as adopting the entire proposal. As with
the administrative-rulemaking process, the more the initial notice from
proponents helpfully addresses key concerns, the higher is the quality
of later discussion and comment. 142 Matters discussed by public
commentators, in turn, identify gaps in proponent explanations or
suggest ways to enhance understanding via elaborations in the final

notice.143

141. See Laird & MacDonald, supra note 31.
142. As Richard Pierce, Sidney Shapiro, and Paul Verkuil observe:
Notice is the core of the informal rulemaking procedure. The agency's
notice of proposed rulemaking starts the process of framing the issues in a
rulemaking by giving interested members of the public a target for critical
comments. The notice consists of two parts, the proposed rule itself (or its
substance) and the agency's stated basis for proposing the rule. Interested
members of the public need both parts to make effective comments on the
proposal.
PIERCE ET AL., supra note 74, at 333-34.
143. See, e.g., Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir.
1985). One "purpose of the notice-and-comment procedure is . . . 'to allow the

agency to benefit from the experience and input of the parties who file comments."'
Id. (quoting Nat'1 Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir.
1978)). Notice-and-comment "educates the agency, thereby helping to ensure
informed agency decisionmaking." Id. (citing Spartan Radiocasting Co. v. FCC, 619
F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1980) and BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637,
642 (1st Cir. 1979)).
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2. Should the Proposalbe TriggeredLater in the Initiative Process,
After a ProposedInitiative has Qualifiedfor the Ballot?
The Working Group proposal would apply to every initiative
proposal filed with appropriate state officials as a prelude to acquiring
petition signatures. The obvious disadvantage of this-one the Group
considered at length-is that it would trigger notice-and-comment
procedures for many initiative proposals that never achieve the
required signature support and, therefore, never make it onto the ballot
prompting a voter response.
The number of ultimately "moot" proposals that would be covered
by our proposed legislation would be significant. Only a little more
than ten percent of the initiative proposals moving to the initial stage
of being titled by the California Attorney General between 2000 and
2011 qualified for the ballot.144 That is why many reform proposals
only apply to initiative proposals unofficially or officially reaching the
threshold of qualification for the ballot.145 The reality that many
initiative proposals do not make it to the ballot may also explain why
the current statutory requirement that appropriate legislative
committees hold legislative hearings on initiative proposals only
applies to ballot-qualified initiatives. 14 6
Still, only applying deliberation-enhancing procedures to ballotqualified initiatives has some obvious downsides. It runs the risk that
initiative proponents would postpone a careful assessment of proposal
implications, including the specific identification of existing laws and
legal precedents affected.14 7 (At a minimum, proponents might not
144. See Initiative Totals by Summary Year 1912-2010, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/pdflinitiative-totals-summaryyear.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). From 2000 to 2010, 63 of 589 proposals
qualified, for a qualification percentage of 10.7%. See id. For the entire run of direct
democracy from 1912 to 2010, 348 proposals out of 1657 qualified, for a
qualification percentage of 21%. See id
145. See, e.g., S.B. 348, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (Legislature
would hold hearing thirty days after petition receives fifteen percent of necessary
vote signatures).
146. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034 (West Supp. 2011) ("Upon certification of an
initiative measure for ballot . .. [t]he appropriate committees shall hold joint public
hearings on the subject of such measure . .

).

147. It is difficult to determine how serious a problem this would be, in part
because there is no hard data on the extent to which ill-conceived initiative
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commit the assessment to a final and fully reviewed writing until they
knew this was necessary, and it might be only when the assessment is
finalized that problems are fully realized.) This downside could
impact the quality of proposal design. The Working Group thought it
important to systematically require careful, written consideration for
all initiatives before they are submitted for petition signatures.
We also thought it desirable that proposals be subjected to
informed discussion before they are submitted for petition signatures.
That way, proponents would at least have the option to revise their
proposals before submitting them to voter approval;148 this would
respond to a perennial complaint about the California initiative
process: the inability of proponents to revise proposals after they are
submitted for voter signatures, even when serious deficiencies have

come to light.149
We further sought to encourage public discussion of initiative
pros and cons at a time when it could influence petition signers. This
may not be a significant gain if critics are correct that signature
decisions are largely reflexive and unthinking, and the success or
failure of signature drives depends ultimately on the financial
resources of proponents.so Still, the Working Group thought it better
proposals reflect failure to anticipate implications. Certainly, there is a subjective
impression among initiative-process analysts that the problem of insufficiently wellconceived proposals is a real one. See supra text accompanying note 50.
148. Representative Laird's public-hearing proposal, A.B. 1245, would have
similarly allowed proponents the option of resubmitting a revised proposal based on
information learned at the hearing. See Laird & McDonald, supra note 31, at 306.
S.B. 384, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) would have offered a similar
resubmission opportunity to proponents wishing to make substantive changes to
their proposals after legislative hearings that would have been triggered when the
number of signatures on petitions reached fifteen percent of the total number
required.
149. See, e.g., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 111 ("Once the
secretary of state certifies that an initiative has qualified for the ballot, the proponent
and the legislature are powerless to amend, improve, or withdraw it-or even
eliminate errors."); Laird & McDonald, supra note 31, at 304 (initiatives "usually
are written in secret, with no public comment or hearings-and no opportunity for
amendment to correct errors or confusing provisions" before post-adoption judicial
review).
150. See, e.g., id at 11 ("Money, rather than breadth or intensity of popular
support, has become the primary threshold for determining ballot qualification in
most instances.").
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to err on the side of creating at least the possibility that voters deciding
whether to sign petitions would have access to helpful information and
cues.
Finally, the Working Group thought it advantageous to assure that
expert discussion and debate about proposals' merits would occur
sooner than later in the process; voters would then have access to the
fruits of the comment period during the entire "election season" for
ballot-qualified initiative proposals.' 5 1
3. Would it Be Possible to Offer the Proposalon a Pilot-Test Basis or
Provide Incentivesfor Proponents to Engage in StreamlinedNoticeand-Comment Voluntarily?
A California legislator with whom we discussed the Working
Group proposal floated an interesting idea: perhaps to ease passage of
a potential reform bill and to allow experimentation with the noticeand-comment process before it is adopted system wide, it could be
offered on a voluntary, experimental basis. 1 52
Brief preliminary brainstorming about the idea suggested that
some proponents might undertake a pilot program of notice-andcomment out of a combination of public-spiritedness and self-interest.
The latter attraction could relate both to the greater assurance our
proposal would provide that sponsor intent would be faithfully
followed in post-enactment judicial review and to the air of greater
151. This aligns the Working Group proposal with former Assembly Member
John Laird's proposal to hold a thirty-day public hearing on initiative proposals
before they are submitted for signature gathering, see A.B. 1245, 2003-2004 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003), and reform proposals designed to move up the time frame in
which current legislative hearings are held on ballot-qualified initiative proposals,
see supra note 62 (summarizing A.B. 943, A.B. 1500, and S.B. 384); see also
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 132 (Legislature should hold hearing
on initiatives within twenty days after the Secretary of State determines that
initiative qualifies for ballot).
It seems unlikely that voters and those cuing them would waste significant
time under our notice-and-comment reform on initiative proposals with little chance
of qualifying for the ballot. Savvy voters and system participants-that is, those
most likely to pay attention to initial notices of proposed initiatory lawmaking or
those who choose to participate in comment periods-could probably separate likely
proposals from unlikely ones.
152. This suggestion is typical of the debt the Working Group owes to former
Assembly member Lori Saldana (D-San Diego) and her staff.
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credibility proposals run through notice-and-comment might acquire.
(This credibility could be enhanced by, for example, according a
special place on the ballot or a special designation in the ballot
pamphlet, indicating that the proposal had undergone special public

vetting.)1 53
Willing proponents could even be offered tangible "benefits"such as a reduced signature requirement for qualifying their
proposal-for voluntarily complying with notice-and-comment
procedures. Allowing a proposal to qualify with a smaller percentage
of voter signatures could be based on the theory that more careful
forethought by proponents and more upfront discussion by interested
parties substitutes partly for the indirect screening function performed
by voter-signature requirements.
4. Can (andShould?) the Proposalbe Adopted by Simple Legislation,
as Opposedto Voter-Approved Initiative
or ConstitutionalAmendment?
As a matter of legal authority, overlaying a streamlined noticeand-comment process, modeled on California's administrativerulemaking process, onto the initiative process could be accomplished
by simple legislation without voter approval. Only fundamental
substitutions for the present initiative process (e.g., establishing an
"indirect initiative" process in which proponents must first propose
their desired laws to the legislature and can only put them on the
ballot after the legislature has refused to act) or system changes
making it significantly more difficult to qualify or adopt ballot
measures (e.g., raising percentage requirements for petition
153. This would not be the first instance of offering special ballot positioning
or designations as a valid reform. See, e.g., A.B. 1359, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 1997) (initiative proposals on same election ballot and deemed by Attorney
General to potentially conflict would be grouped together on ballot); A.B. 679,
1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (ballot measures submitted for voter
approval by Legislature would be more clearly distinguished from proposals
submitted by initiative proponents); DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at
244 (justifying need to "group conflicting propositions in the ballot pamphlet and on
the ballot"). Note that similar incentives could be offered to encourage proponents to
choose to have a public hearing; under our proposal, this is their choice, see supra
text accompanying note 107, and incentives might be useful in encouraging them to
choose to provide an in-person discussion forum.
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signatures) must be proposed as constitutional amendments and/or
submitted for voter approval.154 The pattern of adopted and proposed
initiative-process reforms bears this out.I
Whether submitting a notice-and-comment-style reform to voter
approval-either as a referendum proposed by the Legislature or as an
initiative submitted only to voters-is desirable in the absence of a
legal requirement to do so poses a difficult tradeoff. The greater sense
of public legitimacy voter approval would confer must be weighed
against the irony that the very deficiencies in the current initiative
process the Working Group proposal seeks to remedy could
complicate its consideration or, worse yet, lead to its defeat.156 The
Working Group concluded that reform through legislation passed by
the California Legislature was the better option-a judgment reflected
in the large number of reform proposals considered in the California
Legislature. 5 7
154. See Laird & McDonald, supra note 31, at 305-06 ("The California
Constitution established the major parts of the initiative process, leaving only
procedural parts for the Legislature to determine. [Reformers] could propose a major
change by proposing an amendment to the California Constitution, but that would
require a two-thirds vote in each house of the Legislature followed by a public vote.
... The second option would be to make a statutory change to the procedural parts,
(citing CAL. CONST.
which would only require a majority vote in each house .
art II, §§ 8-11)).
155. Compare, e.g., S.B. 1202, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010)
(proposed as Senate Bill) (would have required ballot pamphlets to list total
contributions of "the top 5 contributors of $50,000 or more to each primarily formed
committee supporting each [initiative] measure"), and A.B. 1245, 2003-2004 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (adopted by both houses as Assembly Bill) (would have
required public hearings before initiative proposals are submitted for petition
signatures), with, e.g., A.C.A. 13, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (proposed
as Assembly Constitutional Amendment) (would have established alternative for
Legislature to adopt versions of qualified initiatives), and A.C.A. 18, 2005-2006
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) (proposed as Assembly Constitutional Amendment)
(would have doubled initiative-petition percentage requirements for constitutional
amendments and initiative statutes).
156. Brendan Bailey and I made the same point in our joint article. Smith &
Bailey, supra note 10, at 262.
157. Id. at 271 (identifying eighty-seven initiative-reform proposals
considered in the California Legislature from 1997 to 2010); see also id app. B at
288-90 (indicating that none of the reform bills passed by both houses of the
Legislature, and ultimately vetoed, were designed to be submitted for voter
approval).
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CONCLUSION

In October 2011, California's direct democracy celebrated its
100th anniversary. The initiative process was originally intended as a
progressive safety valve for individual citizens and grassroots
movements challenging an elected legislature and executive widely
perceived as in the pocket of powerful industries. Although it has
morphed into an expensive and sophisticated political process
involving focus-group-developed proposals and ballot-pamphlet
statements, paid-signature gatherers, and the like, supporters of the
initiative process contend that it still allows reforms out of favor with
the interests and viewpoints entrenched in Sacramento to bypass the
political establishment and become enacted. Critics of direct
democracy see it as an expensive and overly complicated process
captured by the very special interests and public officials it originally
sought to take on.
This and other debates about the overall merits of the initiative
process are likely to rage on. But the reality is that California's direct
democracy isn't going anywhere.' 5 8 Even though they readily
understand the deficiencies of the process, Californians consistently
voice majority support for having an alternative to passing legislation
by elected representatives. Widespread support for direct democracy
at the generic (and even symbolic) level even complicates the passage
of well-meaning reform measures, which can be too easily framed as
attacks on the people's essential prerogatives.
Perhaps the best anniversary present to give to the initiative
process and to the Californians significantly affected by it is to make
the existing process work better. As this Article and the Working
Group Report demonstrate, the improved voter information and
opportunities for expanded deliberation sought by past reformers can
be meaningfully achieved by looking in a new direction. Recognizing
the important parallels between lawmaking by voter initiative and
rulemaking by administrative regulation allows reformers to
selectively borrow from the informal notice-and-comment procedures
routinely and successively used by a wide variety of California

158. See MATHEWS & PAUL, supra note 16, at 175 ("[S]crapping direct
democracy entirely is not a politically viable option.").
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administrative agencies. Important substantive and political
advantages flow from this unexplored route. 159
Adopting a streamlined system of notice-and-comment for
initiatory lawmaking would, as the Working Group Report puts it,
"give voters and those to whom voters look for meaningful cues the
high quality, publicly vetted information they need ... to make
intelligent and positive decisions about initiative propositions."l60
Initiative sponsors "would gain added assurance that courts would
actually implement the results they seek to achieve through great
effort and expense"-which, in turn "would receive more reliable
tools for faithfully achieving the intent of California voters."l 6 1
Especially interested individuals and organizations "would have a
forum for engaging in meaningful discussion about initiative
proposals."l 62 Ultimately, a meaningfully targeted notice-andcomment system for California's direct democracy could "improve the
quality of initiative drafting, promote the rationality of the ensuing
public campaign, and give voters a more informed basis upon which
to cast votes on election day."l 63
In one sense, then, the effort to bring more deliberation to
California's direct democracy is about nothing less that freeing up the
state's voters to "fully express their democratic heritage." 64

159. It is gratifying that fifty-nine percent of 300 diverse Californians
participating in a "Deliberative Poll" weekend discussion of "What's Next
California" initially supported a proposal to "create a process of legislative hearings
or formal notice, comment and administrative review to clarify the proponents'
intent and revise the text of an initiative after it has been filed with the Attorney
General." See Deliberative Poll, June 24-26, 2011: Poll Results, WHAT'S NEXT
CAL. 4, 15 (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.nextca.org/results/entry/summary. It is even
more gratifying that, after discussion of the proposal, support rose to seventy-six
percent. Id.
160. See infra Appendix II. p. 61.
161. See infra Appendix II. p. 61.
162. See infra Appendix II. p. 61.
163. See infra Appendix II. p. 61.
164. See infra Appendix II. p. 62; accord Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274,
277 (Cal. 1982) (citing past California Supreme Court cases to declare that the right
of California voters to adopt initiatives is "one of the most precious rights of our
democratic process").
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APPENDIX I
PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT WORKING GROUP
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. NEW STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO ESTABLISH NOTICE-AND-COMMENTTYPE PROCEDURES FOR INITIATIVE PROPOSALS

Proposed new California Election Code section 9001.1 [to
immediately precede Election Code section 9002, which covers
preparationof an initiative title and summary by the Attorney General,
aspredicates to circulationof initiativepetitionsfor signatures]:

(a) Before submitting a draft of a proposed initiative measure to the
Attorney General pursuant to Section 9002, the proponent of the
proposed measure shall submit to the Secretary of State an initial
notice of proposed initiative lawmaking, which shall include the
following:
(1) A copy of the express terms of the proposed measure, including
an addendum using underline, italics or strikeout to indicate how
the measure would add to, or delete from, current provisions in
the Constitution or laws of this State.
(2) An informative digest drafted in plain English in a format similar
to the Legislative Counsel's digest on legislative bills. The
informative digest shall include the following:
(A) A concise and clear summary of existing constitutional
provisions, laws, regulations, and judicial decisions, if any,
related directly to the proposed action and of the effect of the
proposed measure on such constitutional provisions, laws,
regulations, or judicial decisions.
(B) A policy statement overview explaining the broad objectives
of the proposed measure and, if appropriate, the specific
objectives.
(C) A concise and clear summary of how the particular sections,
subsections, and provisions of the proposed measure are
intended to operate together, including the intended effect of
any provisos, exceptions, or other modifying clauses.
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(D) Any other information which in the judgment of the
proponent could assist interested persons in understanding the
justification for, and intended effect of, the proposed
measure.
(3) A statement as to whether the proponent requests that a public
hearing be held on the proposed measure pursuant to subsection
(b).
(4) The name, address, telephone number, and email address of the
representative of the proponent to whom inquiries concerning the
proposed measure may be directed.
(b)(1) Within 15 days of receipt of an initial notice of proposed initiative
lawmaking required by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall do
the following:
(A) Post the notice in a prominent place on the Secretary's
official website.
(B) Mail or, as appropriate, email the notice to every person who
has filed a request for notices of proposed initiative
lawmaking with the Secretary. The Secretary shall give a
person filing a request for notice the option of being notified
of all proposed notices or being notified of notices concerning
particular subject matter areas.
(C) When appropriate in the judgment of the Secretary, mail or,
as appropriate, email a notice to any person or groups of
persons whom the Secretary believes to be interested in the
proposed measure.
(D) Take other actions which in the judgment of the Secretary
will ensure appropriate notice for interested persons.
(2) The actions specified in subsection (1) shall include notifying
recipients of the time, place, and nature of proceedings for
commenting on the initial notice of proposed initiative
lawmaking.
(c)(1) For a period of 45 days following the posting of an initial notice of
proposed initiative lawmaking pursuant to subsection (b)(1), the
Secretary shall afford any interested person, or his or her duly
authorized representative, the opportunity to submit written
statements, arguments or contentions about matters included in the
initial notice. Such comments shall be promptly posted and
appropriately indexed at a prominent place on the Secretary's official
website.
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(2) When requested by the proponent of a measure pursuant to
subsection (a)(3), the Secretary shall promptly convene a public
hearing for the receipt of oral and written statements, arguments, or
contentions. The Secretary may impose reasonable limitations on oral
presentations and take other actions to facilitate the effectiveness of
the hearing. The Secretary shall arrange for, and promptly post on the
Secretary's official website, a transcript or recording of the public
hearing.
(d) After completion of the opportunity for comment by interest persons
pursuant to subsection (c), the proponent of the proposed measure
shall submit to the Secretary of State a final notice of proposed
initiative lawmaking. Such final notice shall include the following:
(1) A copy of the most recent version of the express terms of the
proposed measure, including an addendum using underline,
italics or strikeout to indicate how the measure would add to, or
delete from, current constitutional or statutory provisions.
(2) An update of the information contained in the initial notice of
proposed initiative lawmaking (as specified in subsection (a)(2)).
(3) A summary of each objection or recommendation made
regarding the initial proposal, together with an explanation of
how the proposed measure has been changed to accommodate
each objection or recommendation, or the reasons for making no
change. This requirement applies only to objections or
recommendations specifically directed at the proposed measure
or to other matters in the initial notice. The proponent may
aggregate and summarize repetitive or irrelevant comments as a
group, and may respond to repetitive comments or summarily
dismiss irrelevant comments as a group. For the purposes of this
paragraph, a comment is "irrelevant" if it is not specifically
directed at the proposed measure or other matters included in the
initial notice.
(e) Within 15 days of receipt of the final notice of proposed initiative
lawmaking required by subsection (d), the Secretary of State shall do
the following:
(1) Post the notice at a prominently place on the Secretary's official
website.
(2) Mail or, as appropriate, email the notice to every person who has
filed a request for notices of proposed initiative lawmaking with
the Secretary.
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(3) Mail or, as appropriate, email the notice to all interested persons,
or their duly authorized representatives, submitting oral or written
comments pursuant to subsection (c).
(4) Take other actions which in the judgment of the Secretary shall
ensure appropriate notice for interested persons.
(f) (1) A proposed initiative measure may not be submitted to the
Attorney General pursuant to Section 9002 or subsequently circulated
for voter signatures under the provisions of this Code until the initial
and final notices required by subsections (a) and (d) are submitted to
the Secretary and until the comment period required by subsection (c)
is provided. Compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of this
section shall not otherwise be subject to judicial review, and this
section shall not be construed in any manner that results in the
invalidation of an initiative lawmaking measure because of the
alleged inadequacy of the content of the initial or final notices.
(2) The provisions of this section apply only to initiative measures,
not to referendum measures.
B. NEW STATUTORY PROVISIONS TO AUTHORIZE JUDICIAL CONSULTATION
OF INFORMATION CREATED DURING
NEW NOTICE-AND-COMMENT PROCEDURES

Proposed new California Code of Civil Procedure section 1859.1 [to
immediately follow current CCP section 1859, "Construction of statutes
or instruments; intent']:

THE INTENTION OF THE VOTERS AND INITIATIVE
PROPONENTS. In the construction of a law enacted by voter initiative,
the intention of the voters is to be pursued, if possible; and in ascertaining
such intent appropriate consideration shall be given to the intentions of
proponents as expressed in the initial and final notices of proposed
initiative lawmaking submitted pursuant to Election Code subsections
9001.1(a) and (d), including how final notices respond or fail to respond
to statements, arguments or contentions made by interested persons
during the comment period afforded by Election Code subsection
9001. 1(c).
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APPENDIX II
THE TAKING THE INITIATIVE WORKING GROUP*
FINAL 2009 REPORT**

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. What We Propose
The California initiative process is rooted in the optimism that
ordinary citizens can improve California's legal system and society.
This Report seeks to continue in that tradition by stimulating public
discussion and consideration of a novel avenue for meaningful reform.
Unfortunately, the present system for considering and adopting
legislation through voter initiative has two main problems:
1. Voters only dimly perceive the implications of initiative
proposals.
* The Working Group consisted of California Western School of Law Professor
Glenn Smith; then-California Western students Scott McClain, Andrea GableMower, Jeremy Snider, Wil Wenzel, and Patricia Zlaket; and then-University of
California, San Diego, undergraduate students Brendan Bailey and Jordon Ferguson.
** 2011 NOTE FROM PROFESSOR GLENN SMITH: With a few exceptions,
the version of the Report appearing as this Appendix is the version approved in
February 2009 after months of drafting and deliberation by the contributors
identified in the previous note. To respect the original collaborative process (and
because it is unrealistic to expect the Report's far-flung authors to come together
years later for yet another revision), no general attempt has been made to "update"
the Report. (However, in adopting the excellent suggestions of California Western
Law Review editors, I made some editorial changes to the text and added some
citations and explanations to footnotes. I also made a few changes and additions
reflecting the different context in which the Report is being published. Last, I added
several notes referencing helpful sources published since 2009.)
Specifically, the Report's discussion of initiative-campaign dynamics, the
limitations of "section 9304" legislative hearings on initiative proposals, and the
like, seek to accurately portray the situation as of early 2009. It is my perception that
few, if any, of the informational and deliberative problems discussed in this Report
have abated substantially. Although this is unfortunate for Californians, it does at
least assure the continued utility of the Report's discussion and recommendations.
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2. Courts frequently guess about voter intent and undervalue or
ignore indicators of sponsor intent.
As a result, misinterpretations and other unintended consequences
abound.
An initiative process with enhanced disclosure and deliberation
would benefit voters, initiative sponsors, public policy stakeholders,
and courts. We believe that all these well-intentioned participants
would benefit from adopting new legislation that would
1. require initiative sponsors to communicate more fully with
the public about their legislative intent;
2. establish a meaningful yet manageable structure by which
interested parties can discuss initiative proposals; and
3. authorize courts to rely on the public record generated by
proposals 1 and 2. in decisions interpreting and applying
initiatives that have been adopted into law.
Adoption of these proposals would greatly benefit California
voters, who are asked to make important decisions at least twice a
year when considering a wide array of ballot propositions. The
reforms we propose would give voters and those to whom voters look
for meaningful cues the high quality, publicly vetted information they
need when serving as legislators; voters would be enabled to make
intelligent and positive decisions about initiative propositions.
Sponsors would gain added assurance that courts would actually
implement the results they seek to achieve through great effort and
expense. Individuals and organizations with a special stake in public
policy issues would have a forum for engaging in meaningful
discussion about initiative proposals. California courts would receive
more reliable tools for faithfully achieving the intent of California
voters. Ultimately, the changes we recommend would improve the
quality of initiative drafting, promote the rationality of the ensuing
public campaign, and give voters a more informed basis upon which
to cast votes on election day.
B. Who We Are
No one in the Taking the Initiative Working Group is a public
official or has any presumed standing to identify wrongs or
recommend improvements. Nor does anyone involved in the
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publication of this Report have any vested interest in the outcome of a
particular proposed initiative. We are a law professor who has studied
and written about the California initiative process and public-spirited
law school and undergraduate students. We acknowledge, and stand
on the shoulders of, many reform-minded individuals and
organizations proposing a broad range of reforms in the last several
decades.
We spent months in collective and individual research and writing
to produce this Report because we believe that adopting the reforms
we propose would remedy serious deficiencies in how initiative
proposals are explained to the public, debated, and interpreted in
court. Without taking a position on the value of other proposed
reforms, or even on the ultimate wisdom of legislating by initiative,
we seek to cause a public conversation about the validity of tailoring
California's notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to the
initiative context.
We do not present these proposals as the last word on a more
informative and useful process for clarifying "initiatory intent."
Rather, we seek to apply the methods we advocate by presenting our
recommendations and seeking public comment. We hope to generate
deliberation among the broad spectrum of private individuals, public
officials, and reform-minded organizations which will need to work
together to adopt meaningful initiative reforms so that California
voters can fully express their democratic heritage.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT INITIATIVE SYSTEM

A. Deficits in Information
1. California Voter Attitudes
As a general matter, California voters are largely supportive of the
initiative process. In a survey conducted in 2008 by the Public Policy
Institute of California, "six in ten California residents and likely voters
[felt] public policy decisions made by voters during the initiative
process were probably better than decisions made by the governor and
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legislature."' There was little division along party lines on the issue of
initiatives-55% of Democrats, 61% of Independents, and 64% of
Republicans surveyed believed California voters make better public
policy decisions than legislators and the governor. 2
Yet, when the 2008 survey asked whether the initiative process is
in need of reform, a very different picture emerged. "Nine percent of
Californians [we]re very satisfied with the way the initiative process is
working, but half (51%) [we]re only somewhat satisfied and one in
three [we]re not satisfied."' Similar sentiment emerged when the
survey asked Californians whether the initiative process was in need
of changes or "is basically fine the way it is." 4 Sixty-four percent of
respondents thought the process needed "major" or "minor" changes
(with 36% percent voting for "major changes"). 5
More significant are specific indications that majorities
consistently feel inadequately prepared to vote on initiatives at
present. Fifty-three percent of Californians directly reported in a
September 2000 survey that they did not have "enough information to
decide how to vote on citizens' initiatives." 6 Recognition of the
deficits in information they receive about initiatives was also implicit
in the 78% of Californians who reported in 2008 that the "'ballot
wording for citizens' initiatives is often too complex to understand
what would happen if a particular initiative passed."'
A majority of voters also consistently tell surveyors that they
would support reforms to improve deliberation. In the 2008 survey,
75% of those surveyed endorsed a system of review and revision for
1. Californians and the Initiative Process, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL. (Nov.

http://web.archive.org/web/20081229064238/http://www.ppic.org/content/
2008),
pubs/jtf/JTFInitiativeJTF.pdf (accessed by searching for the website address in the
Internet Archive index).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. J. Fred Silva, The California Initiative Process: Background and
Perspective, PUB. POL'Y INST. CAL. 27 (Nov. 2000), http://www.ppic.org/content/
pubs/op/OP 1100FSOP.pdf (summarizing results of September 2000 survey).
7. Californiansand the Initiative Process,supra note 1. Information overload
is also reflected in the fifty-nine percent of respondents reporting in the same survey
that "there are too many propositions on the state ballot." Id.
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all proposed initiatives to try to avoid legal issues and drafting
errors."8 An earlier 1998 survey found 63% endorsed a more
deliberative process, in which "[a]fter an initiative has qualified for
the ballot, the Legislature would have a short time period to hold
hearings on the initiative and to adopt technical or qualifying changes"
which would be submitted to voters if initiative proponents agree. 9
Support for these reforms likely reflects a belief that more deliberation
about initiatives would reduce drafting errors and avoid complicated
legal issues arising with past ballot proposals.
2. Problems with Previous Initiatives: Two Prominent Case Studies
Most initiatives deal with new and complex issues about which
voters lack expertise. This only increases the need for organized,
effective communication to voters about the impact, cost, and
potential legal (including constitutional) problems initiatives may
present. Unfortunately, as analysts of the California initiative process
have long noted, voters generally lack meaningful information on
which to make intelligent decisions. A major cause of that lack of
meaningful information is the absence of real venues for rational
deliberation about the merits and implications of initiative proposals.
As indicative of the general view found in the available literature,
we briefly summarize how Professor John Allswang's book-length
analysis of the initiative processo describes California voter
experience with two high-profile initiatives: Proposition 63 in 198611
and Proposition 209 in 1996.12
Included on the November 1986 election ballot, Proposition 63
sought to amend the California Constitution to make English the
official state language. Essentially, Proposition 63 sought to build on
the popular Proposition 38, an "opinion measure" adopted by 71% of
8. Id.
9. Silva, supra note 6, at 32.
10. See JOHN M. ALLSWANG, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN
CALIFORNIA 1898-1998, at 182-83, 208-09 (2000).
11. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, 1986 GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET 44-47
(1986), availableat http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/ 1986g.pdf.
12. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, 1996 GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET 94
(1996), availableat http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/1996g.pdf
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voters in 1984 expressing Californians' desire to print voting materials
in English only.' 3
Professor Allswang's analysis of Proposition 63 points to serious
problems from the standpoint of both voter information and
deliberation. 14 The Proposition's language was imprecise and
proposed no solution other than directing the Legislature to pass
"appropriate legislation" to enact the Proposition.' 5 Voters had littleto-no guidance as to what this "appropriate legislation" would include,
how much it would cost, or what impact amending the California
Constitution to include English as the official state language would
have on that document, judicial precedents, or other aspects of state
law.' 6 Further, the majority of scrutiny for Proposition 63 came from
the media. Opponents were highly unorganized and could not raise
enough money to mount a viable fight against the proponents.
Professor Allswang further argues that, despite receiving support
from 73% of the voters, Proposition 63 provided little more substance
than Proposition 38 did two years earlier.' 7 In addition to signifying a
cultural split in the state,' 8 Proposition 63 led to unanticipated
repercussions. One was a lawsuit producing a 1988 decision from the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, vacated on procedural
grounds, reading Proposition 63 as "primarily a symbolic
statement." 19
Proposition 209, Professor Allswang's second example among
many, was the most controversial ballot measure in 1996. The
Proposition proposed the general abolition of affirmative action plans
in California. 20 Amid significant national debate on this subject,
Proposition 209 supporters and opponents spent a considerable

13. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, 1984 GENERAL ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET 51
(1984), availableat http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballotpdf/1984g.pdf.
14. See ALLSWANG, supra note 10, at 182-83.
15. Id. at 182.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 182-83.
19. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988),
vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
20. ALLSWANG, supra note 10, at 208.
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amount of money on advertising and support for their positions.21
However, little information flowed to voters about the specific impact
Proposition 209 would have on legislation and judicial precedents.
Influential business interests sat out of the debate because they were
not interested in aligning themselves with either side. 22
Instead, California voters appeared to get the majority of their
information on Proposition 209 from political candidates and
inflammatory media coverage. Presidential candidate Robert Dole
began promoting Proposition 209 during his later campaign stops in
California, touting it as an anti-racism measure.23 Opponents used the
media to portray Proposition 209 as an extremely racist measure, and
painted David Duke, a noted Ku Klux Klan member, as a supporter of
the proposition.24 In the end, Proposition 209 passed, but little
information about its impact or cost reached the public. Proposition
209 was immediately the subject of litigation challenging its
constitutionality. 25 The Proposition has been challenged in several
subsequent lawsuits since 2000.26
The 1996 election involving Proposition 209 is also notable for
two other phenomena. First, as the popularity of email and various
internet sites rose in the mid-to-late 1990s, Proposition 209
proponents and opponents engaged in the first large-scale use of
internet sites to disseminate information. 27 Even the new technology
proved mostly futile in disseminating useful information to voters.2 8
The sites were primarily accessed by those working on the campaign,
or those already firmly on one side or the other of the various
propositions.2 9
21. See id. at 208-09.
22. Id. at 209.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 210.
25. See Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 697, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1997)
(reversing district court's preliminary injunction barring implementation).
26. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-641
SC, 2010 WL 5094278, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010) (rejecting latest equal
protection challenge and citing two others in 2000 and 2010).
27. ALLSWANG, supranote 10, at 208.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Second, the year 1996 also saw the rise of multi-proposition
committees. These large committees both opposed and were in favor
of a multitude of propositions, which led to voter confusion. 30
Allswang notes that one committee's name was especially
mystifying-"Taxpayers Against Frivolous Lawsuits, No on
Proposition 211, A Coalition of Seniors, Small Businesses, Taxpayers,
High Technology, and Financial Services Companies and Associates
(and oppose Propositions 207, 208, 210, 212, 214, 216, 217 and
support Propositions 192, 200, 201, 202, 203, and 204)."3 While there
may be advantages to multi-purpose proposition committees, they can
confuse voters looking for information about the specific impact of the
various propositions.
The Proposition 63 and 209 examples noted above illustrate the
problems this Working Group seeks to remedy by disseminating
relevant and high-quality information to voters needing to make
informed decisions about California initiatives. Lack of proper
information not only frustrates and misleads voters, but leads to
unnecessary litigation and delays in implementing voter initiatives.
Unfortunately, as the studies of Professor Allswang and others
suggest, the problems are not new, and have been ongoing for
decades.
B. The Lack ofDetailedand High-QualityInformation and
Deliberation:The February2008 Initiative Campaign as a Case
Study
To determine whether past information and deliberation deficits
about initiatives continue into the present, our Working Group
analyzed the information readily available to the general public about
Propositions 92-99 and Propositions 1A-12-the initiative proposals
on the February 5, 2008, primary election ballot; the June 3, 2008,
primary election ballot; and in the November 4, 2008, general
election. 3 2 Our assessment suggests three main conclusions:
30. Id. at 207.
3 1. Id.
32. Proposition 91 was not addressed in the study because its proponents
ultimately urged voters to "Vote No on 91" (because in their view, legislation had
already incorporated their intended legal revisions). This quelled the debate on 91.
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1. Proponents and opponents of the 2008 ballot propositions
generally did not provide detailed or useful information. The
two sides rarely engaged in actual debate or deliberation.
2. Other interest groups, political parties, and public officials to
whom voters often look for guidance on public issues were
surprisingly absent as providers of useful voting cues for the
2008 ballot items.
3. Because the previously mentioned outlets gave no noticeable
cues, the media-which largely relies on those sources for
their own reporting-provided limited help to voters seeking
information regarding the ballot measures.
1. Proponent/OpponentInformation is Often Insufficient, Emotionally
Charged,and Unresponsive to the "Other Side"
Voters understandably look to initiative proponents and key
opposition organizations for information about the rationale behind,
and the likely implications of, ballot propositions. One problem with
this information is that it is frequently incomplete about key issues.
For example, the supporters of Proposition 93 on the February 2008
ballot, which would have shortened absolute term limits for the
Legislature as a whole but removed term limits for each house, did not
report that a majority of incumbent legislators would have their terms
extended. 33 Another example comes from Propositions 94-97, which
proposed to expand casinos on American Indian reservations.
Opponents of these propositions argued that the proposed casino
expansions would increase state gambling problems, yet opponents
failed to disclose that the main funding behind this opposition itself
came from tribes owning major gambling institutions. 34 (Even when
See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: FEBRUARY

5,
2008, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION 10 (2007), available at http://primary2008.
sos.ca.gov/voterguide/lang/eng.pdf. Although we reviewed every proposition in the
November 4, 2008, election, we were only able to do in depth analysis of
Propositions 4, 5, 6, and 9.
33. See id. at 20-21 (providing arguments for and against Proposition 93).
34. See

CAL.

SEC'Y OF

STATE,

OFFICIAL VOTER

INFORMATION GUIDE

SUPPLEMENT: FEBRUARY 5, 2008, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION 12-36 (2007),

available
at
http://primary2O08.sos.ca.gov/voterguide/lang/english-sup.pdf;
February2008 PresidentialPrimaryElection: About the Propositions,CAL. VOTER
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the "other side" ultimately provided this information, as noted below,
the failure to "join" issues left voters with a skewed and incomplete
basis for evaluating the claim.)
A second problem is that much of the information provided by
initiative sponsors and detractors focuses less on rational details and
more on emotionally charged (and often substantively tenuous)
appeals. For example, proponents of several 2008 propositions evoked
emotional themes of war, crime, and anti-terrorism. The Faculty
Association of California Community Colleges supported Proposition
92, which would have increased funding for community colleges by
$300 million. 35 This group fielded a campaign song tying the cause of
enhanced funding to themes of strife associated with military
service. 36 Groups opposing Proposition 5, which mainly sought to
divert drug abusers from incarceration to drug rehabilitation programs,
stated that perpetrators of unrelated crimes (e.g., grand theft auto,
child molestation, arson) can claim that a drug addiction forced them
to commit that crime, and be diverted to a drug rehab program. They
made this claim despite it not being in the statutory language of
Proposition 5.3 A group in support of Proposition 98, the Apartment
Owners Association, likened opponents of the Proposition to
terrorists. 3 8 Finally, instead of focusing on broader statistics or policy
questions, supporters of Propositions 4 and 9 used anecdotal claims

(last
http://calvoter.org/voter/elections/2008/primary/props/index.html
and
97).
95,
96,
Propositions
against
arguments
(providing
28,
2008)
July
visited
35. See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 34, at 13-14.
36. See Blue Rain, Proposition 92 Song, FAC. Ass'N CAL. COMMUNITY
COLLEGES, www.faccc.org/song.htm (last visited July 28, 2008) ("A young soldier
tryin' to rebuild his life / Lookin' towards the future for him and his wife / Spilled
his blood for his country, now he's lost the game / No money for school - no soldiers
/ Well who's to blame?").
37. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: NOVEMBER
4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 39, 86-106 (2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.
ca.gov/past/2008/general/pdf-guide/vig-nov-2008-principal.pdf.
38. Dan Fuller, How to Protect Your Property Now Or.... Lose it Later!!,
APARTMENT OWNERS Ass'N NEWSL. (Apartment Owners Ass'n of Cal., Inc.), 2008,
at 1, 3, available at http://tenantstogether.org/downloads/AOANewsletter.pdf
("Terrorists hit apartment owners with 'explosives'. . . . Ever hear about the 'suicide
bombers' who are terrorizing owners over the state? Of course, you have. They are
our current day politicians who vote to forcibly seize your property rights.").
FOUND.,
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about two girls being abused in order to persuade people to vote for

their side. 39
A third problem with information from principal supporters and
opponents is that the traditional ballot-pamphlet forum allows each
side to sidestep the other's arguments, thus failing to "join" the issues
in a way that would provide illumination to voters. For example,
supporters of the community-college-enhancing Proposition 92 failed
to indicate how they would fund the increased financial supporteven after their opponents pointed this out several times.40 The
proponents constantly responded that the proposition was neither
going to raise taxes nor cut spending. 4 1 Although they adeptly stated
where the funding was not going to come from, they simply did not
answer the charge of the opposition-that, because Proposition 92
does not "identify a way to pay for all the new spending," it could lead
to "politicians" raising sales or other taxes.42 There is little incentive
for either side to answer the other's questions, and thus such questions
are ignored.
3. Less than Illuminating "Backup" Cues from Other Interest
Groups and PoliticalParties
Initiative process observers note that voters pick up generalized
"cues" and additional information about how to vote from interest
groups or political parties to which they align.4 3 Some might argue
that such cue reading compensates for lack of detailed and useful
39. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 37, at 28, 62. Proposition 4 required that
parents be notified before a minor gets an abortion, and used "Sarah" as anecdotal
evidence. Id. at 24-29. The actual existence of "Sarah" was a main contention in this
debate. See id. at 28. Proposition 9 sought to have victims get involved in every step
of the criminal justice process, prevent the substantial diminishment of criminal
sentences, and lengthen the time between parole hearings for people sentenced to
life. Id. at 58-61.
40. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 34, at 16-17; see also Yes on Prop 92,
CALIFORNIANS FOR IMPROVING CMTY. COLLS., http://prop92yes.com (last visited
July 28, 2008).
41. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 34, at 16-17.
42. Id. at 17.
43. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, DemocratizingDirect Democracy: Restoring
Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "DisclosurePlus," 50 UCLA L.
REV. 1141, 1149-59 (2003).
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information and deliberation available to voters directly. If the
experience with the 2008 elections is typical, however, meaningful
cues are often lacking.
A large majority of key interest groups simply did not list a
position or opinion on initiatives proposed on the February 2008
ballot.4 4 A significant number of interest groups took "no position" on
the Indian gaming propositions;45 these groups merely stated, but did
not explain, the basis for their neutrality. Given the significant defects
noted above about the information and deliberations attending the
Indian gaming propositions, this meant that the public was especially
bereft of cues with which to navigate a generally unenlightening flood
of print media, television, and radio advertising.
Even for that minority of interest groups which took generic
"Yes" or "No" positions on 2008 ballot propositions, their positions
tended to be accompanied by only the briefest of statements
explaining their positions. The explanations generally rehashed the
publicly available positions of supporters and opponents, and rarely
provided new analysis or information to the voters. For example, the
California Log Cabin Republicans stated: "Proposition 92-Community
Colleges Funding. Governance. Fees. Oppose. More mandatory
budgeting through the ballot box with no accountability." 46 Another
example was the People's Advocate Proposition Voter Guide, which
merely stated: "Prop 91: No Position/ Prop 92: NO/ Prop 93: NO!/
Prop 94,95,96,97: NO."4 7 The Lincoln Club of San Diego County
44. Our researcher used a list of interest groups adapted from the California
Voter Foundation and the California Progress Report in researching each
proposition. The researcher searched more than 123 websites for information about
each proposition; of these websites, 16% had information about Proposition 92, 12%
had information about Proposition 93, and 10% on Propositions 94-97.
45. The propositions referred to are Propositions 94-97, which probably had
the most television coverage and were the most politically charged at the time. Our
researcher discovered that 50% of the organizations listing opinions for Propositions
94-97 declared themselves neutral, while 18% were neutral on Proposition 92, and
26% were neutral on 93.
46. LOG CABIN REPUBLICANS OF CAL., http://web.archive.org/web/200802141
12232/http://www.logcabin.org/logcabinca/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008)
(accessed by searching for website link in the Internet Archive index).
47. People's Advocate Proposition Voter Guide, PEOPLE'S ADVOCATE,
http://www.peoplesadvocate.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (screenshot on file with
author).
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stated in its pamphlet: "Proposition 98 Regulation of Private Property
Vote Yes" and "Proposition 99 Eminent Domain Vote No." 4 8 Even
when organizations try to provide a bit more analysis, its relative
brevity stops short of providing detailed explanations or persuading
voters not already sympathetic to the organizations' views. For
example, the California Federation of Teachers' opinion on
Propositions 94-97 stated: "No 94-97. Amends Indian gaming
compacts/ Codifies gambling deals that fail to protect work rights,
protect the environment, or provide any funds to schools and
colleges." 4 9
Nor were political parties and officials an especially rich source of
cues for voters in the 2008 elections. A number of political party
websites stated positions of neutrality on proposed initiatives. Even
when parties took positions, they tended to advocate a bare "yes" or
"no" vote without substantial further explanation-although the Green
Party was a noted exception.50 Further, it was even rarer for individual
public officials, rather than their political parties, to post their
positions on their websites for the February 2008 propositions.
3. The GeneralLack of Meaningful Informationfrom Media Sources
The lack of meaningful information and deliberation from
supporters, opponents, other interest groups, political parties, and
officials had a derivative effect on media coverage of the February
2008 ballot propositions. Newspaper coverage available on the
Internet generally repeated the summary arguments of supporters and
opponents or reprinted portions of Legislative Analyst evaluations
from the official ballot pamphlet. But media information did not

48. 2008 Endorsed Ballot Measures, LINCOLN CLUB OF SAN DIEGO CNTY.,
(last
http://www.sdlincolnclub.org/mc/page.do?sitePageld=61225&orgId=1csdc
visited May 25, 2008) (screenshot on file with author).
49. Legislative Matters, CAL. FED'N OF TEACHERS, http://www.cft.org/
resources/leg/pdfs/cftslate08.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
50. For example, the party explained that it supported Proposition 92 because
it guaranteed community college funding and was a good investment for California,
and it opposed Proposition 93 as a ploy to keep a prominent Democratic
officeholder in office. See Green Voter Guide, GREEN PARTY OF CAL.,
http://cagreens.org/elections (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
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significantly add to the total storehouse of information available to
voters.
Typical of such articles was one published on December 13, 2007,
in the Press-Enterprise,a newspaper covering Riverside County and
surrounding areas. After briefly explaining that Proposition 92 (on the
February 2008 ballot) sought to "roll back student fees and guarantee
funding for California's community colleges," the article stated that
"[p]owerful education groups such as the California Teachers
Association, the University of California regents and Cal State trustees
oppose the measure, which is supported by a coalition of communitycollege associations and faculty groups." 5 ' The article then devoted
five sentences to summarizing and quoting the positions of two
proponents, characterized opponent positions in seven sentences
summarizing several concerns and quoting a spokesperson for the
California Teachers Association, and used four sentences to repeat
budget estimates from "[t]he nonpartisan Legislative Analyst's
Office." 52 (Media editorials generally followed a similar pattern.) 53
4. Two Bright Spots: Often Useful Legislative Analyst Perspectives
and a Joint Cal Channel/CGSProject
Experience with the initiative process in 2008 was not uniformly
disappointing. Although the actual arguments on the ballot pamphlet
51. Elaine Regus, Community-College Ballot Measure Not an Easy Sell to
Educators, PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside,
Cal.)
(Dec.
13,
2007),
http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/29145.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Editorial, No on 92: Bad Ballot Box Budgeting, BAKERSFIELD
(Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.bakersfield.com/opinion/editorials/
CALIFORNIAN
x41286912/No-on-92-Bad-ballot-box-budgeting (summarizing proponent arguments
in three sentences, summarizing opponent rebuttals in seven sentences, noting that
"[fjunding concerns are pitting two of the state's most powerful teachers unions
against each other," and citing the estimate of funding and budget impacts from
"Legislative Analyst Elizabeth Hill"); Editorial, No on 94, 95, 96, 97: Sucker Bets
We Can 't Win, MODESTO BEE (Jan. 17, 2008), http://digital.library.ucla.edu/
websites/2008 999 002/nounfairdeals.com/blog/no-on-94-95-96-97-sucker-betswe-cant-win/default.htm (briefly characterizing Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's
"optimistic" state-revenue-increase projections from expanded Indian gaming,
countering them with "much smaller" prediction from "the nonpartisan Legislative
Analyst Office," and summarizing proponent and opponent positions on whether
tribes could abuse "serious loopholes" in how state revenues are calculated).
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generally failed to provide detailed and helpful information, another
part of the ballot pamphlet often did. The Legislative Analyst's
initiative summary often provided voters with an overview of the
broad outlines of initiatives and gave some useful details, especially
about fiscal and legal implications. 5 4 Even so, on occasion the
Analyst's mission to remain unbiased appeared to restrict the Analyst
from fully disclosing useful information. This can be seen with
Proposition 8, the simplest and most contentious of the propositions
on the November ballot. 5 The Legislative Analyst stated that the
California Supreme Court had invalidated Proposition 22 (the
statutory predecessor of Proposition 8), but failed to explain the
court's rationale. 56 Regarding Proposition 9, the Analyst stated that
the Proposition may conflict with a federal court case, Valdivia v.
Schwarzenegger, but the Working Group does not feel that the
54. These analyses vary significantly as to detail and specificity. For example,
the Legislative Analyst's analysis for Proposition 5 (a November 2008 ballot
proposal entitled "Nonviolent Drug Offenses, Sentencing, Parole and
Rehabilitation") ran more than 5,000 words and provided a summary of the
proposal's basic effects, a discussion of the three-track drug-treatment-diversion
programs the initiative proposed to set up (replete with a chart listing which
offenders would be included and excluded from each track), a detailed description of
how the initiative proposal would otherwise change existing parole and
rehabilitation programs, and a table and multi-part discussion detailing major fiscal
effects. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 37, at 30-37. By contrast, the analysis for
Proposition 2 (a November 2008 ballot proposal entitled "Standards for Confining
Farm Animals") ran fewer than 500 words, briefly described current animal cruelty
laws, summarized the proposal in two sentences, and concluded that if "higher
production costs" associated with different animal-handling practices "cause some
farmers to exit the business, or otherwise reduce overall production and profitability,
there could be reduced state and local tax revenues" of an "unknown" magnitude
"potentially in the range of several million dollars annually." Id. at 17. The analysis
also noted "unknown, but probably minor, local and state costs for enforcement and
prosecution" that would be "practically offset by revenue from the collection of
misdemeanor fines." Id. The analysis did not speculate about the cost issue likely to
be even more on the minds of voters: impact on food prices.
55. Proposition 8 overturned, a May 2008 ruling by the California Supreme
Court holding that laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriage violated the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution. See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra
note 37, at 55. The proposition amended the California Constitution to provide that
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."
Id. at 128.
56. See id. at 55.
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Analyst gave an adequate explanation of the case.5 (The bigger
problem is that, by inherent design, the Legislative Analyst's input can
neither speak authoritatively for initiative sponsors nor adjudicate the
conflicting or incomplete claims of both sides.)
The 2008 general election had an especially extensive ballot.
Voters had to concentrate on their Presidential choice, their Assembly
Member choice, and a number of local elections. Moreover, there
were twelve ballot propositions, of which ten would have added
statutes or constitutional amendments by voter initiative; these voterinitiated propositions spanned a wide variety of important topics
requiring sophisticated decisions.5 8 In response to this, certain groups
sought to provide useful, unbiased information. Most notably, the
Center of Governmental Studies' "Video Voter" project provided
short statements by and interviews with one proponent and one
opponent of eight of the propositions on the 2008 election ballot."
57. See id. at 60.
58. The table of contents of the 144-page Voter Information Guide for the
November 2008 general election listed the ten initiatives as follows:
Proposition 2: Standards for Confining Farm Animals. Initiative Statute.
Proposition 3: Children's Hospital Bond Act. Grant Program. Initiative
Statute.
Proposition 4: Waiting Period and Parental Notification Before
Termination of Minor's Pregnancy. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.
Proposition 5: Nonviolent Drug Offenses. Sentencing, Parole and
Rehabilitation. Initiative Statute.
Proposition 6: Police and Law Enforcement Funding. Criminal Penalties
and Laws. Initiative Statute.
Proposition 7: Renewable Energy Generation. Initiative Statute.
Proposition 8: Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry. Initiative
Constitutional Amendment.
Proposition 9: Criminal Justice System. Victims' Rights. Parole Initiative
Statute.
Proposition 10: Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Renewable Energy. Bonds.
Initiative Statute.
Proposition 11: Redistricting. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and
Statute.
CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 37, at 3. (Two other propositions on the

November ballot, Propositions 1 and 12, were bond-issue proposals (relating to
high-speed rail bonds and bonds relating to veterans services, respectively) placed
on the ballot by the California Legislature. Id.)
59. Interviews, VIDEO VOTER, http://www.videovoter.org/index.php?option=
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Although brief and one-sided, these statements and interviews could
have modestly facilitated voter education by pointing voters toward
sources of useful information.60
C. Legislative PublicHearingson ProposedInitiatives:A Promising
Idea Not Yet Fully Realized
California law already provides one further, potentially useful
source of information about proposed initiatives beyond what is
provided in the ballot pamphlet. Section 9034 of the California
Elections Code obligates "appropriate committees" of the California
Senate and Assembly to "hold joint public hearings on the subject of
[each initiative measure certified to appear on the ballot] at least thirty
days prior to the election date for the initiative. "61 Admittedly, these
legislative hearings are not intended to provide the kind of in-depth
information and deliberations among interested persons recommended
by our Working Group; nor does the text of section 9034 ensure that
the information will be provided before the beginning of the initiative
campaign period, thus assuring maximum voter consideration.6 2 Still,
comcontent&view-article&id=174&ltemid=98 (last visited May 1, 2011);
Statements, VIDEO VOTER, http://www.videovoter.org/index.php?option=com
content&view-article&id=175&ltemid=97 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). Video Voter
recorded only a proponent statement and interview for Proposition 2, and only
opponent statements and interviews for Propositions 4 and 8. There were no
statements or interviews for Proposition 12.
60. 2011 NOTE FROM PROFESSOR GLENN SMITH: The "Archive"
section of the Video Voter website does not contain similar proponent/opponent
statements or interviews for later elections. Instead, Video Voter's more recent
voter-education efforts appear to emphasize "Voter Minutes"-in which a CGS
staffer narrates "short explainer videos that provide a concise overview of a ballot
measure[], for instance: what a yes or no vote means, who is for and against a
measure, and where one can go for more information." See Voter Minutes, VIDEO
VOTER, http://videovoter.org/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=102
&Itemid=37 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
61. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9034 (West 2008).
62. Specifically, the current joint legislative hearing format lacks a mechanism
to require initiative sponsors to provide detailed information about the scope and
application of their proposals. And even if legislative hearing conveners secured the
participation of all major organizations supporting and opposing a particular ballot
measure-which would itself be a Herculean task for particularly significant or
controversial propositions-nothing in the legislative-hearing format would require
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consistently held and readily accessible legislative hearings would
give voters direct and indirect recourse to additional potentially useful
information about the scope and application of proposed ballot
measures.
Unfortunately, if the experience with February 2008 initiative
proposals is typical, section 9034 legislative hearings are neither
uniformly conducted nor readily accessible to even highly diligent
researchers. One of our Working Group members who has substantial
experience in research methodologies conducted a comprehensive
search for hearings on Propositions 91 through 97. Our member could
only find information hearings on Proposition 92 (relating to funding
for community colleges) and Proposition 93 (relating to legislative
term limits).
Even these hearings would have been very hard for a voter
researcher to uncover. Searching the Senate and Assembly websites
for information on hearings about proposed initiatives is a timeconsuming endeavor yielding few, if any, results relating to proposed
initiatives. 63 Nor are searches for public hearings through a generic
internet-search engine likely to yield useful results. Such a search
those testifying to engage to meaningfully "join issues" and respond to each other's
arguments. Further, as noted below, present judicial approaches to initiative
construction would not credit any statements made by sponsors at these hearings;
there would be little incentive to use the hearings to make useful legislative history.
Finally, the timing provision of section 9034 guarantees that the joint hearings are
held after the initiative is qualified for the ballot, and they can take place as late as
thirty days before the election. Thus, whatever useful information and deliberation
these hearings prompt comes later in the process than the sponsor disclosure and
notice-and-comment processes this Working Group proposes. Our procedures would
ensure that improved information on proposed initiatives is available at the start of
the campaign.
63. At least as of September 14, 2008, the date on which the websites
described here were last visited, the California Legislature's website pointed to
hearings in the Legislature's "Daily File"-a daily publication referencing the
Legislature's activities, including committee hearings. See CAL. ST. LEGISLATURE,
http://www.legislature.ca.gov (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). Unfortunately, the only
way a member of the public could have received this information was to access the
website on a daily basis and search through the hearings for that day. The California
Senate and Assembly Committee websites had links to hearings, however, very few
of these links include hearings for propositions on the ballot. See CAL. ST.
ASSEMBLY, http://www.assembly.ca.gov/defaulttext.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2008);
CAL. ST. SENATE, http://www.senate.ca.gov (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
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conducted by the Working Group member produced an overwhelming
amount of information, none of which had to do with legislative
hearings on initiatives. The experience with the February 2008
election further shows that voters able to learn of the hearings that
were conducted would still have had difficulty accessing them. 64
In sum, while the intent of section 9034 is admirable, the
execution appears to be lacking. Information on the required public
hearings is very difficult for even the most diligent searcher to access.
This, combined with the inevitable realities that section 9034 hearings
will not likely trigger an in-depth interchange between initiative
sponsors and opponents and that the required hearings may come late
in the process of voter consideration, suggest that legislative hearings
are unlikely to provide the kind of detailed information and
deliberation this Report recommends.
D. Current CaliforniaJudicialApproaches to Initiative
Interpretation:Ongoing Frustrationfor Sponsors,
Voters, Courts, and the Law
So far the discussion has focused on difficulties preceding
enactment of ballot propositions. However, other difficulties occur
after initiatives are adopted-specifically, when California courts are
called upon to interpret the intent and application of enacted initiatives
during subsequent lawsuits. The Working Group reviewed forty-one
64. The California Legislature, website did provide links to listen to hearings.
See Hearings and Events, Audio and Television Information, CAL. ST.
http://www.legislature.ca.gov/the statelegislature/calendar and
LEGISLATURE,
schedules/audio tv.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008). However, this service was
limited to that day's hearings; previous hearings were not available. The hearings
may also have been broadcast on the California Channel, which is available on
television or over the Internet. See CAL. CHANNEL, http://www.calchannel.com (last
visited Sept. 14, 2008). But again, even a motivated voter might have faced
formidable barriers. From the main website for the California Legislature, there was
no direct link to the California Channel. Not until the researcher entered the Senate
or Assembly website could he access the Channel's website. Upon reaching the
website, it was difficult to maneuver-in order to find hearings, the researcher first
had to select "Webcasts" then "Search Archives." Then, the researcher had to type
in the proposition number in order to find any hearings. The amount of time and
effort it took to find information and access public hearings on the California
Channel made it very difficult for a voter to find the information he or she needed.
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California Supreme and appellate court decisions cited and analyzed
in law review articles written by Professor Jane Schacter 65 and
Working Group member Professor Glenn Smith.66 These articles, and
the judicial opinions they cite-opinions categorized by issue and date
of decision in Table 1, appearing at the end of this section-indicate
common deficiencies in the approach California courts have used for
decades in interpreting the meaning of voter-passed initiative
legislation.
Voter-passed initiatives often end up in court. Competing litigants
argue extensively (and expensively) about the proper interpretation of
initiative language, and substantial judicial energy must be devoted to
answering questions of initiative intent and application. 67 In these
initiative-interpretation cases, California courts typically take the same
approach as when interpreting laws passed by the California
Legislature. First, the courts review the plain language of the statute
passed by the initiative; at this stage, courts may use a variety of rules
and presumptions of statutory construction. If the language of the
statute remains ambiguous, the courts look to other information
presented to voter-legislators when the initiative was passed. This
information includes ballot pamphlets and Legislative Analyst Office
reports available for the election. Occasionally, courts reference
existing statutes and cases to harmonize them with the adopted
initiative. However, California courts have repeatedly declined to
consider other evidence about the intent of the initiative's sponsors
because this intent was not officially communicated to voters.
If all this effort produced uniformly reliable and accurate judicial
interpretation, consistently honoring the intentions of voters and
65. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "PopularIntent": Interpretive Dilemmas
in DirectDemocracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
66. Glenn C. Smith, Solving the "Initiatory Construction" Puzzle (and
Improving DirectDemocracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U.
COLO. L. REv. 257 (2007).

67. Initiatives are often subject to a different kind of legal challenge in which
opponents argue that an initiative is void because it is procedurally or
constitutionally defective. Although initiative-sponsor intent may be considered in a
judicial analysis for procedural or constitutional compliance, it is in interpreting
legally validated initiatives that courts centrally address questions of application and
intent (the focus of this section).
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initiative sponsors, then the time and expense would be worthwhile.
However, a decade and a half of research and scholarly commentary
suggests that, to the contrary, the current judicial approach to
interpreting initiatives is seriously flawed.
The problems begin with the way California courts focus on the
"intent of the voter." On a superficial level, this focus on voter intent
makes sense. Initiative voters stand in the shoes of legislators, and
California courts traditionally seek to determine legislators' intent in
giving meaning to representative-enacted laws. However, the voterlegislator analogy has its limitations because voters generally lack
detailed and authoritative information on which to base their
decisions. Given current deficits in information and deliberation,
voters are unlikely to form a sophisticated understanding or "intent"
about how the provisions in an initiative might apply to the full range
of problems the initiative seeks to address. It is even more difficult for
voters to form an intent with respect to how initiatives should interact
with each other, or how they may affect current statutes and judicial
decisions. Voters, even more than legislators, are likely to defer the
details to the experts who draft, and advocate on behalf of, proposed
laws. After all, voters lack staff, access to public hearings, and the
many other sources of official and unofficial information routinely
available to legislators.
The current judicial approach to initiative construction assigns an
often-unrealistic degree of specific intent to voters. One 2005
California Supreme Court decision attributed to California voters the
specific intent that "the trial court's discretionary authority under
Penal Code section 1170.19, subdivision (a), to commit a minor to the
Youth Authority applies only when the minor meets the eligibility
requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6.",6' The
court found that the electorate developed this specific intention even
though "resolving this issue require[d] the interpretation and crossreferencing of five statutes from two different codes." 69 It implies no
disrespect for California voters to doubt that they in fact arrived at any
such sophisticated understanding. More likely, the interpreting judges
reached this view on their own and, thinking it imminently logical,
attributed it to the voters.
68. People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564, 565 (Cal. 2005).
69. Id. at 568.
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Current California initiatory construction is curious in another
way. As the California Supreme Court made clear in a 2003 decision,
California courts interpreting initiatives are forbidden from consulting
"evidence of the drafters' intent that was not presented to the
voters."70 This means that only the brief, general, and often emotional
sponsor sentiments expressed in ballot-pamphlet arguments are
admissible to solve complex initiative-construction problems.
California courts generally ignore detailed evidence about the
intentions of the individuals and organizations who draft and sponsor
initiatives-those who have thought most deeply about initiatives and
on whose judgment the voter significantly depends. This current
approach to initiative interpretation contrasts sharply with the method
used by courts to interpret laws passed by the legislature; in the
legislation context, courts consider and credit a wide variety of
evidence about the specific and strategic goals of sponsors.
The judiciary's general refusal to consider sponsor intent may
reflect in part an admirable respect for California voters. It also likely
shows suspicions about the reliability of expressions of sponsor intent
not placed "on the record." Courts may validly fear that sponsor
statements outside of the ballot-pamphlet context will be misleading,
careless, or inaccurate. 7 1 If so, great value would flow from adopting
the effective and cost-efficient procedures we propose. If initiative
sponsors could reliably and specifically declare their intentions and
have a constructive dialogue with interested persons-one that would
as a by-product further clarify and refine sponsor intent-courts
would be more likely to use detailed and reliable indications of
sponsor intent.

70. Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 958 (Cal. 2003).
71. Ironically, the present judicial posture may encourage irresponsible
statements by some sponsors by assuring them that irresponsible or misleading
advocacy in forums other than the ballot-pamphlet would not be "used against them"
when their initiatives are construed.
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TABLE 1: How INITIATIVES END UP IN COURT: LITIGATED DISPUTES OVER
THE MEANING OF ADOPTED INITIATIVES IN SELECTED CALIFORNIA CASES
72
(BY INTERPRETIVE ISSUE RAISED AND DECISION DATE)

Issue: How Initiative Interacted with California Constitutional
Provisions
*Silicon Valley Taxpayers Ass'n v. Santa Clara Cnty. Open Space
Auth., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853 (Ct. App. 2005).
*Hi-Voltage Wire Works v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal.
2000).
People v. Jones, 857 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1993).
*Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
*People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985).
Issue: How Initiative Interacted with Other California Statutory
Provisions
*People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564 (Cal. 2005).
*In re Brent F., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833 (Ct. App. 2005).
*Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005).
*Tain v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Med., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330 (Ct.
App. 2005).
*Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2003).
*Hodges v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1999).
*Horwich v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 927 (Cal. 1999).
People v. Jones, 857 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1993).
People v. Meyers, 858 P.2d 301 (Cal. 1993).
DaFonte v. Up-right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992).
Whitman v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262 (Cal. 1991).
Curl v. Superior Court, 801 P.2d 292 (Cal. 1990).
Travelers' Indem. Co. v. Gillispie, 785 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1990).
People v. Burton, 771 P.2d 1270 (Cal. 1989).
People v. Guerrero, 748 P.2d 1150 (Cal. 1988).
72. Cases denoted by an asterisk are referenced in Glenn C. Smith, Solving the
"Initiatory Construction" Puzzle (and Improving Direct Democracy) by
Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor Intent, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (2007). All
other cases are referenced in Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent":
Interpretive Dilemmas in DirectDemocracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
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People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987).
People v. Woodhead, 741 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1987).
People v. Fritz, 707 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Jackson, 694 P.2d 736 (Cal. 1985).
*People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Bigelow, 691 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1984).
People v. Turner, 690 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1984).
Issue: How Initiative Interacted with Prior California Judicial
Decisions
*Tain v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Med., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330 (Ct.
App. 2005).
People v. Guerrero, 748 P.2d 1150 (Cal. 1988).
People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987).
People v. Hendricks, 737 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1985).
*People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Turner, 690 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1984).
Issue: How Initiative Interacted with Other Ballot Propositions
*A-rmijo v. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (Ct. App. 2005).
*Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005).
Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 863 P.2d 694 (Cal. 1993).
Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 327 (Cal. 1992).
*Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
Issue: Whether Initiative Applied Retroactively
*Armijo v. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (Ct. App. 2005).
Tapia v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 434 (Cal. 1991).
Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988).
People v. Garcia, 684 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1984).
Issue: How Criminal-Law Change Intended to Affect Defendants
*People v. Thomas, 109 P.3d 564 (Cal. 2005).
*In re Brent F., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833 (Ct. App. 2005).
*Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2003).
In re Littlefield, 851 P.2d 42 (Cal. 1993).
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People v. Jones, 857 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1993).
People v. Meyers, 858 P.2d 301 (Cal. 1993).
Whitman v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262 (Cal. 1991).
Curl v. Superior Court, 801 P.2d 292 (Cal. 1990).
In re Harris, 775 P.2d 1057 (Cal. 1989).
People v. Andrews, 776 P.2d 285 (Cal. 1989).
People v. Burton, 771 P.2d 1270 (Cal. 1989).
People v. Griffin, 761 P.2d 103 (Cal. 1988).
People v. Guerrero, 748 P.2d 1150 (Cal. 1988).
People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917 (Cal. 1988).
People v. Anderson 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987).
People v. Woodhead, 741 P.2d 154 (Cal. 1987).
People v. Balderas, 711 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Boyd, 700 P.2d 782 (Cal. 1985).
*People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Fritz, 707 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Hendricks, 737 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Jackson, 694 P.2d 736 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380 (Cal. 1985).
People v. Bigelow, 691 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1984).
People v. Turner, 690 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1984).
Issue: How Civil-Law Change Intended to Affect Various Parties
*Hodges v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1999).
*Horwich v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 927 (Cal. 1999).
DaFonte v. Up-right Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992).
Travelers' Indem. Co. v. Gillispie, 785 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1990).

III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Variations on a FamiliarTheme: Greater
Information and Consultation
Our Working Group is not the first to suggest that the California
initiative process is in need of improvements to better serve California
voters. Nor is our group the first to suggest improvement at the
fundamental deliberative level-improved information to voters,
improved sponsor disclosure, and improved collaboration with
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interested parties. Other organizationS73 have undertaken similar
studies in California and recommend reforms with themes similar to
those sounded in our "Taking the Initiative" Report. California
legislators have also introduced and seriously considered reforms to
make the initiative process more deliberative.74
First, previous reformers sought to provide more detailed
information for voters in a variety of ways. These suggestions range
from use of new technology to improve existing informationdissemination techniques. One suggestion, for example, is to change
areas of the Secretary of State's website to create a more user-friendly
environment for voters accessing information.7 5 Other suggestions
73. Among those included is the Center for Governmental Studies (CGS), a
non-profit, non-partisan organization committed to creating innovative political and
media solutions to help individuals participate more effectively in their communities
and governments. Also considered is the Public Policy Institute of California
(PPIC), a non-profit organization dedicated to informing and improving public
policy in California through independent, objective, nonpartisan research.
Additionally, the work of the National Conference of State Legislators (NCSL), the
Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA), and the Ballot Initiative Strategy Center
Foundation (BISCF) were also included. 2011 NOTE FROM PROFESSOR
GLENN SMITH: The Of-Counsel Attorney and President of the Center for
Governmental Studies elaborated on the organization's initiative-deliberationenhancing proposals in a recent article. See Nora Kashani & Robert Stern, Making
California'sInitiative Process More Deliberative,47 CAL. W. L. REV. 311 (2011).
74. 2011 NOTE FROM PROFESSOR GLENN SMITH: After the finalization
of the Working Group Report-and based on extensive background research done
for it by Group member Brendan Bailey-he and I wrote a comprehensive article
surveying the last fourteen years of legislative reform proposals and highlighting
proposals relating to deliberation enhancement. See Glenn Smith & Brendan Bailey,
Legislative Reform of California's Direct Democracy: A Field Guide to Recent
Efforts, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 259 (2011). In particular, we focused on reform
proposals primarily or secondarily related to making the initiative process more
deliberative. Id. at 271-75; see also id. app. C at 291-96 (summarizing twenty-three
proposals in tabular form).
75. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 237-38 (2d ed. 2008), available
CGS
http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/cgs dbifull book f.pdf.
at
envisioned that such a website would serve as a clearinghouse of information; the
site would include audio and video sources and would allow voters to discuss and
share information about ballot initiatives. Id. A related CGS proposal recommends
that voters should be able to opt to have ballot initiative information received by
email instead of regular mail. Id. at 247.
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include enhancing voter understanding by improving information on
the ballot pamphlet, such as grouping competing initiatives together,
encouraging use of charts and graphs in the pro and con argument
section, or simplifying readability standards for state-written
materials.7 6 Some groups have proposed disclosure of sponsorship in
advertisements and initiative funding, and increased public education
on the subject of the initiative process.77
In these ways, various groups have made recommendations with a
common theme of increasing the amount and quality of information
disseminated to the public in the initiative process. A variety of reform
bills considered in the California Legislature have pursued a similar
purpose. These range from a 1997 proposal to allow the Secretary of
State to ask three retired state-appellate judges to review the
constitutionality of initiative proposalS 78 to a 2006 proposal to transfer
responsibility for conducting hearings on ballot-qualified initiatives
from the California Legislature to the Little Hoover Commission (a
body arguably more able to concentrate on in-depth analysis).7 9
Second, it is apparent that organizations and officials proposing
initiative-process reform share a common desire to promote
consultation between initiative sponsors and interested parties
(including individuals, organizations, and political officials). Various
groups and legislative reformers suggest an enhanced role for the
legislature in the initiative process through consultation and
negotiation with initiative proponents; a variant would allow time for
the California Legislature to adopt the substance of a proposed piece
of legislation.8 0 Other promising proposals seek to enhance
deliberation between initiative sponsors and interested partiesincluding a 2003 bill passing both houses of the Legislature which
would have subjected draft initiative proposals to thirty days of public

76. Id. at 244, 246, 364-65.
77.

See, e.g., Nat'l CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND

at x-xii (2002), available at
IN THE
21ST CENTURY,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1 /documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR-report.pdf.
78. See A.B. 677, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997).
79. See S.B. 1243, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
80. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 75, at 361.
REFERENDUM
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comment before seeking to qualify initiatives for the ballot,8 1 and an
earlier 1992 proposal that public hearings be conducted once initiative
sponsors have gathered twenty-five percent of the required
signatures. 8 2
In sum, others have recognized that effective initiative reform
includes providing more information to voters, thereby holding
sponsors more accountable in the process. Others have also seen the
value of promoting greater deliberation among those in a position to
improve the substance of ballot propositions and voter understanding
of their implications. Ideally, an improved process would better
declare the detailed intentions of initiative sponsors and inform them
of interested parties' concerns prior to initiative circulation. In turn,
requiring sponsors to provide improved information to voters on
proposed legislation would strengthen the process, and reduce
confusion among voters and in the courts.
B. The Rulemaking Process in Californiaas a Proposed
Modelfor Initiative Reform
Our Working Group believes that the reforms to which others
have pointed can best be achieved by looking in a previously
unrecognized direction. Specifically, we recommend that the initiative
proposal process borrow selectively from the notice-and-comment
procedures long used by California administrative agencies when they
adopt rules functionally equivalent to laws. The remainder of this
section summarizes the key phases of the administrative rulemaking
process and delineates how we propose to adapt them for the initiative
context. The next section explains why notice-and-comment
rulemaking is an apt metaphor for lawmaking by initiative.

81. See A.B. 1245, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). 2011 NOTE
FROM PROFESSOR GLENN SMITH: For a recent article on A.B. 1245, co-written
by its legislative author, see John Laird & Clyde MacDonald, A.B. 1245 of 2003 An Attempt at Modest Reform of California'sInitiative Process, 47 CAL. W. L. REV.
301 (2011).
82. See Silva, supra note 6, at 14 (summarizing a 1992 recommendation of the
twenty-four-member California Commission on Campaign Financing).
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1. ProvidingEarly PublicNotice ofIntendedInitiative Lawmaking
As with rulemaking at the federal government level and in other
American states, in California, the first major step toward adopting a
regulatory "law" is the issuance of notice of proposed rulemaking. 83
The essential elements of this notice-which are posted on agency
websites, published in an official register, and sent to various specially
interested parties-are the text of the proposed law change, an
explanation of how the proposal would affect current laws and
regulations, and an overview of the major objectives the proposal
seeks to achieve. 84
Our Working Group proposes that, before submitting their
proposed initiative measure for initial qualification by voter-signed
petitions, proponents would file a "notice of proposed initiative
lawmaking" with the California Secretary of State. Similar to notices
of proposed administrative rulemaking, this initiative-lawmaking
notice would provide the text of the intended changes to current
constitutional or statutory provisions. Because legal disputes over the
meaning of initiatives often concern their application to current
83. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.5 (West 2005). For complex rules, public
involvement may begin sooner. As the Office of Administrative Law explains,
agencies planning to adopt complex proposals face a "pre-notice involvement"
requirement; these agencies may involve the public in workshops or other
preliminary activities prior to the start of the formal rulemaking process. OFFICE OF
ADMIN. LAW, How TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 3 (2006),
available at http://www.oal.ca.gov/res/docs/pdf/howtoparticipate.pdf Individuals
may contact agencies to be added to their mailing lists to ensure they are notified of
the opportunity. Id. Additionally, agency websites often provide information on
upcoming rulemaking actions. Id. Proponents of complex initiatives might do well
to seek a similar earlier public involvement. However, consistent with our intention
to limit the initiative notice-and-comment process to the barebones necessary to
accomplish reform objectives, the Working Group has not recommended that such
"pre-notice involvement" be required.
84. California law also imposes a variety of specialized study requirements,
such as mandates that agencies document the financial impact of proposed rules on
California business, that agencies explain how they considered and rejected
regulatory alternatives, and the like. Such analyses might improve the formulation of
certain types of initiative proposals, but the Working Group is reluctant to propose
their adoption across-the-board. In significant part, this reflects the Working
Group's commitment to impose only the most universally applicable and most
valuable rulemaking requirements on the process of initiative drafting and proposal.
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constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions (as well as judicial
opinions), the notice would also prompt proponents to explain the
proposal's impact on these sources of law. Similarly, the notice would
address how different initiative provisions relate to each other, a
subject often probed in lawsuits about the application of initiativepassed laws. Finally, the notice would give proponents an opportunity
to describe in appropriate detail their proposal's objectives.
We recognize that mailing the notice to all voters would be
prohibitively expensive. Moreover, millions of voters are already
inundated with election information; detailed mail notices might only
bog down the process further.8 5 Thus, our proposal places the
responsibility on the Secretary of State to post the notice on the
agency's website and otherwise distribute the report (using email to
the extent feasible) to interested parties. Specifically, our
recommendations borrow from procedures used for administrative
rulemaking by allowing interested persons to place themselves on a
list of interested notice recipients maintained by the Secretary. Of
course, it is likely that many initiative sponsors and other
organizations interested in voter education would place the notice (or
links to the Secretary of State's website) on their own websites.
2. Establishinga Processfor Public Comments
on ProposedInitiatives
To accomplish its second reform goal-establishing an effective
and cost-efficient process to promote a constructive consultation
among initiative sponsors and interested officials, organizations, and
individuals-the Working Group also believes it desirable to borrow
from the California rulemaking process. California law requires that,
after they provide notice of proposed action, administrative agencies
allow interested persons to comment on the proposal over a forty-fiveday period. 86 California law always allows the submission of written
85. Hard mailers would not be eliminated entirely; voters would simply need
to request hard mailers, making the electronic format the main hub of information.
86. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.4(a)(1) (West 2005) ("At least 45 days prior to
the hearing and close of the public comment period on the adoption, amendment, or
repeal of a regulation, notice of the proposed action shall be .

..

[m]ailed to every

person who has filed a request for notice of regulatory actions with the state agency.
Each state agency shall give a person filing a request for notice of regulatory actions
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"statements, arguments, and contentions"; oral statements at public
hearings can be triggered either by the agency or by a request from an
interested party." The Working Group's proposal is to require a fortyfive-day written comment period and leave it to initiative proponents
to determine whether a public hearing, conducted under the auspices
of the California Secretary of State, should be held.
Through selective borrowing from the time-tested comment
procedures used by California, the federal government, and other
states, our Working Group thus seeks to promote an expanded
dialogue about proposed initiatives to achieve several goals, including
(1) identifying ways in which initiative proposals can be improved
prior to their submission to the voters, and (2) developing a more
detailed "public record" available to voters in making intelligent
decisions at the ballot box. The comment period in particular is an
excellent way for the public to become involved and informed before
the initiative is placed in circulation.
One important logistical issue is ensuring that public comments
are easily accessible to initiative proponents, other would-be
commentators, the media, and the public. Our Working Group
proposes to handle this concem by having the Secretary of State create
a central web location where all comments on proposed initiatives and
their accompanying notices can be easily and cheaply compiled. We
envision a process similar to that already in place for U.S.
governmental agencies. There is a central "one-stop source" for all
regulations or rulemakings issued by the U.S. Government." The
website includes regulations that are open for public comments, as
well as finalized regulations and supporting materials.

the option of being notified of all proposed regulatory actions or being notified of
regulatory actions concerning one or more particular programs of the state
agency.").
87. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.8 (West 2005).
88. REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Sept. 23,
2008).
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3. PromotingDialogueAmong Initiative Proponentsand Other
Knowledgeable and InterestedParties
The third facet of the California notice-and-comment rulemaking
process we deem worthy of emulation is the requirement that, when
they finalize their proposed changes to the law, administrative law
changers update the information they provided in their initial notice
and respond to the comments made during the comment period.89
Making initiative sponsors responsible for responding to relevant
comments promotes dialogue and accountability. Proactive sponsors
would naturally seek to listen to the interested parties and engage with
them in real discussions about eventual consequences of initiatives;
sponsors would have a natural incentive to respond to comments and
refine initiatives in an effort to get voter support. Sponsors who
ignored valid public comments would worry that they would be
admitting the truth of the comments and that this could affect them
adversely in the court of public opinion and in courts of law (when the
meaning and application of initiatives are at issue).
Speaking of courts, our selective transplantation of rulemaking
procedures into the initiative context aims to enhance public education
and deliberation-not to complicate the initiative process or bog it
down in legal red tape. Therefore, the adequacy of proponent
compliance with notice-and-comment procedures (including how
thoroughly proponents have responded to public comments) would not
be judicially reviewable; further actions to qualify initiatives for a
place on the California ballot would not be postponed by lengthy
judicial challenges. 90 Instead, the Working Group proposal would rely
on the natural incentives explained in the previous paragraph.
Eliminating judicial review would streamline the process and lessen
89. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11346.9 (West 2005).
90. Our proposal does provide that submission of initial and final notices to
the Secretary of State is a prerequisite to further initiative qualification steps. We
envision that appropriate legal authorities (such as the California Attorney General,
who is responsible under section 9002 of the California Elections Code for drafting
official titles and summaries for initiative petitions) would not cooperate with
initiative proponents who flatly failed to file the required notices. As with all failures
of governmental authorities to follow statutory requirements, the failure of
governmental authorities to withhold cooperation from non-participating initiative
proponents would to this limited extent be subject to judicial correction.
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the burden on sponsors, while simultaneously creating a process that
would naturally hold sponsors to a higher standard of communicating
intent in the initiative process.
4. EncouragingAppropriateJudicial Use ofProponentNotices
and Public Comments During Subsequent
Litigationover Adopted Initiatives
One final mission of the Working Group is causing California
judges-when called upon to interpret initiatives ultimately adopted
by the state's voters-to consult and place appropriate reliance on the
expanded record of intent that will be created by the achievement of
the previously listed mission goals.
Adoption of the recommended notice-and-comment procedures
would yield easily consultable, authoritative expressions of the
impacts proposed initiatives intend, and do not intend, to have. In both
the initial and final notices of proposed initiative lawmaking,
proponents would declare their intentions, including how they plan for
their proposals to interact with current sources of law. And in
responding in the final notices to the statements, arguments, and
contentions made by interested parties (or in admitting the validity of
those statements, arguments, and contentions by failing to respond),
initiative proponents would further clarify their intentions.
Even though California voters place significant de facto reliance
on the judgment and intentions of initiative proponents, as noted
earlier, California courts are disinclined to give any consideration to
expressions of proponent intent not included in the severely spacelimited "argument" section of the official ballot pamphlet. (In
practical effect, this only permits consideration of the most generic,
emotionally inflated proponent statements.) Thus, the Working Group
believes that it is necessary to augment current legal provisions on the
construction of statutes with language authorizing judicial recourse to
the fruits of the new notice-and-comment procedures. We note that the
Working Group's proposed language continues to reference the
importance of voter intent91 and requires only "appropriate
91. This is consistent with section 1859 of the California Civil Procedure
Code, which declares that "[i]n the construction of a statute the intention of the
Legislature ... is to be pursued, if possible."
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consideration" to the expanded intent indicators. Courts would
continue to rely on their accumulated wisdom as to when intent
indicators are reliable and probative. And construction of legislation
passed by initiative would continue to be governed by general
provisions specifying that construing judges are to respect the
democratic process and the judgments of the law-makers. 92
C. Why the Administrative Model is Relevant to the Initiative Context
At first blush, it might seem odd to recommend borrowing tools
from the administrative rulemaking context to improve direct
democracy. However, there are several important reasons why this
proposal makes sense.
First, the informal-notice-and-comment rulemaking process
provides a long-standing, well-understood, and generally wellregarded means for assuring that changes in current laws are imposed
only after their scope and implications are fully understood and
discussed. California administrative agencies have used these
procedures for decades to make important policy decisions in a wide
variety of contexts. In 2006, the California Supreme Court recognized
the ability of the informal-notice-and-comment process to promote
"responsiveness and public engagement" and to "ensure that those
persons or entities" affected by a new policy "have a voice in its
creation." 93
Critics of the rulemaking process point to the potential for time
delays and over-elaborate explanations on the part of rule proponents
in the administrative model.9 4 But we believe that these problems stem
from a combination of onerous specialized data requirements and
(potentially multiple rounds of) judicial review of agency compliance.
92. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1858 (West 2008) (duty of judge is "simply
to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained [in legislation],
not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted").
93. Morning Star Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 132 P.3d 249, 254 (Cal.
2006); see also Voss v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225, 229 (Ct. App. 1996)
(notice-and-comment procedures are "intended to advance 'meaningful public
participation"').
94. CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 102-13 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing several issues
detracting from rulemaking timeliness).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2011

93

California Western Law Review, Vol. 48 [2011], No. 1, Art. 2

94

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

That is, with extensive specialized reporting requirements and strong
incentives to avoid being ensnared in litigation over procedural issues,
agency officials understandably over-correct. As noted previously, we
would expressly preclude judges from reviewing the adequacy of
sponsor compliance with the new procedures for improving initiative
proposal; we would rely instead on non-judicial incentives for a goodfaith response. Along with rigorous time limits for the initiative
consultation process, this preclusion of judicial review should prevent
over-formalization and delays.
Second, initiative sponsors stand in a relationship to voters that is
significantly similar to the relationship between administrative agency
officials and legislators. Agency officials act as the delegates of
legislators, who look to these agents for expertise and judgment.
Voters give a similar-albeit more informal and ad hoc-deference to
initiative sponsors. Additionally, in contrast to elected legislators,
voters elect neither administrative agents nor initiative sponsors; yet
both exercise important policy making judgment with short and longrange impacts on voters, their communities, and their state. 95
Third, modified use of administrative-type notice-and-comment
procedures for the proposal and discussion of initiatives would
appropriately respond to important differences in the ways California
voters relate to sponsors of initiatives, as compared to the ways
California legislators relate to sponsors of the laws they adopt. As part
of their official duties, legislators regularly interact with their
colleagues who sponsor legislation. Even when legislation originates
outside of the legislative branch (e.g., when proposals stem from the
Governor, other executive branch officials, or non-official advocacy
groups), legislators relate to these non-legislative sponsors in ongoing,
reciprocal ways. As "repeat players" in an official legislative system,
sponsors of legislature-enacted laws are constrained to operate with a
degree of responsibility and credibility not guaranteed in the initiative
process. Further, legislators have an official hearing process and
95. As with most analogies, this one is not perfect. Administrative agents can
adopt legally binding rules without legislative approval (although the legislature can
override those rules by passing new laws). The proposals of initiative sponsors are,
by contrast, not legally binding until a majority of voters approve them. Further,
administrative agencies operate under some broad legislative parameters, whereas
initiative sponsors are free to propose any legal change they believe the voters will
accept.
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multiple sources of useful information from which to check and
balance information provided by sponsors.
By contrast, initiative sponsors stand in a significantly less formal,
more episodic relationship to the voters who serve as their legislative
gatekeepers. This relationship lacks similar incentives for credibility
and veracity, and voters have little, if any, effective outside
information sources. Thus, notice-and-comment-type procedures
would provide sponsors with a regular mechanism for making their
case in detail and having their representations checked and balanced
by a deliberative process.
IV. CONCLUSION

Supporters and critics of the California initiative process have
long debated its merits. In the meantime, Californians continue to
adopt politically, economically, and socially vital laws through a
process that fails to provide optimal information to voters and the
judges called upon to implement their will. Inadequate information
combines with the absence of a meaningful structure for rational,
sophisticated dialogue about the merits and implications of proposed
legal changes to produce a variety of untoward consequences.
The official source of voter information-the official ballot
pamphlet-has important limitations. The severely space-limited
"pro" and "con" arguments engaged in by initiative supporters and
opponents cannot hope to provide meaningful details; far too often
this limited give-and-take provides more heat than light. Even if the
neutral, expert explanation provided by the non-partisan Legislative
Analyst's Office could cover all relevant issues, which may not be
practical, the Office cannot speak authoritatively and conclusively for
the sponsors or provide the equivalent of a detailed public give-andtake. Together, neither the ballot-pamphlet arguments nor the
Legislative Analyst report can provide the kind of extended debate
and discussion to which laws are routinely subjected when considered
and passed by the California Legislature. As a result, the voters who
are asked to stand in legislator shoes twice a year (and the judges who
must interpret their work product) must act without the fruits of a
meaningful dialogue.
As voters and other observers of the California initiative process
have long recognized, the information sources outside of the official
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ballot pamphlet leave much to be desired. So do opportunities for
deliberation afforded by the initiative status quo. The information
available from initiative sponsors, interest groups, political parties,
public officials, and the legislative hearings envisioned by California
law is too often non-existent, insufficient, or emotionally charged. The
key issues are too rarely "joined" in anything resembling a
deliberative dialogue. The quality of initiatives proposed and adopted,
the democratic experience of voters, and the predictability and quality
of subsequent judicial review are all significantly compromised.
Fortunately, easily adoptable and time-tested remedies are at
hand. By selectively and commonsensically adapting several key
facets of the notice-and-comment procedures our state has for decades
used to adopt crucial administrative rules, California can provide to
initiative proponents, voters, the media, judges, and other interested
parties an efficient, expeditious mechanism by which:
* sponsors could set forth in detail their intent;
* interested parties could engage in meaningful deliberations on
the merits and implications of proposed initiatives;
* voters would have access-directly or indirectly through the
sources they typically consult on public-policy matters-to
detailed and high-quality information on which to cast their
votes; and
* judges could go beyond what is at best an "educated guess" in
fathoming the intent of initiative sponsors and voters.
Adoption of these relatively simple steps could bring profound
improvements to direct democracy in California.
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